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A rose by any other name: the World Congress of Families in Moscow

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In one of my previous posts and a guest op-ed for War is Boring, I wrote that the US-based anti-LGBT hate group World Congress of Families (WCF) planned but then cancelled its annual meeting (World Congress of Families VIII) "Every Child A Gift: Large Families – The Future of Humanity". It was supposed to take place in Moscow on 10-12 September 2014. Discussing possible reasons for the cancellation of the event, I wrote:
[Following the outrageous annexation of Crimea by Putin’s Russia], the U.S. imposed sanctions on three Russian individuals — Vladimir Yakunin, Yelena Mizulina and Aleksey Pushkov— who have cooperated with WCF, among others.

Since the WCF is, above all, a U.S.-based organization, they most likely decided not to risk harming its reputation domestically by dealing with the sanctioned individuals.
One organisation that had planned to take part in WCF VIII in Moscow, Concerned Women for America, pulled out for a similar reason. As its president Penny Nancesaid, "We made the decision that we’re not going to Russia. I don’t want to appear to be giving aid and comfort to Vladimir Putin".

As it often happens with the "good Christians" from various hate groups, the cancellation story was a lie. The WCF VIII did take place in Moscow on 10-11 September 2014, but had a different - yet unsurprisingly similar - name: the International Forum "Large Family and Future of Humanity".

The WCF's General Director Lawrence Jacobs and Communications Director Don Federwere listed as members of the Organising Committee of the congress on the website of the Foundation of St. Andrew the First-Called, but were later removed in order not to disclose openly the WCF's involvement. However, here is the screenshot of the unedited webpage:

(Click to enlarge) A screenshot of the unedited page on the website of the Foundation of St. Andrew the First-Called showing the list of the Organising Committee featuring the WCF's Larry Jacobs and Don Feder
In their August 2014 Newsletter, the WCFwrote:
WCF held a leadership strategy meeting for representatives of pro-family groups attending the event. There were reports on the upcoming International Forum: Large Family and Future of Humanity (Moscow, September 10-12, 2014) and World Congress of Families IX, Salt Lake City, October 27-30, 2015.
Note that the meeting in Salt Lake City in 2015 will be called WCF IX, not WCF VIII (it would have been natural, since WCF VIII was allegedly cancelled), so this is yet another confirmation that the International Forum "Large Family and Future of Humanity" is in fact the planned WCF VIII "Every Child A Gift: Large Families – The Future of Humanity".

Yet the leadership of the WCF and other organisers of the meeting strove so much to obscure the WCF's involvement that even the WCF's General Director Larry Jacobswas presented on the Facebook page of Konstantin Malofeev's St. Basil the Great Charitable Foundation not as the head of the WCF but as "President, CEO of Jabez Consulting".

(Click to enlarge) The St. Basil the Great Charitable Foundation quotes Lawrence Jacobs as "President, CEO of Jabez Consulting". Note the hash-tags, however.
Jacobs is indeed the founder of the Jabez Consulting, but he does not even bother to mention this fact in his main profile on LinkedIn where he describes himself primarily with a clear relation to the WCF.

The LinkedIn profile of the WCF's Larry Jacobs
In other words, the organisers of the WCF meeting in Moscow have done much to confuse casual observers, but too little - to deceive others. The US authorities may have questions to the WCF concerning their contribution to the uncivil society in Russia and cooperation with sanctioned individuals (see below).

Compare the logos of the WCF and the International Forum
Apart from the WCF, the meeting was co-organised by the Russian Orthodox Church, Vladimir Yakunin's Centre of National Glory and the St. Andrew the First-Called Foundation, and Konstantin Malofeev's Saint Basil the Great Charitable Foundation. Both Yakunin (sanctioned by the US) and Malofeev (sanctioned by the EU) are Russian oligarchs. Moreover, Yakunin is one of the most important representatives of the siloviki group that now seems to control the Kremlin, while Malofeev is an important connection to the EU-based far right parties and has been deeply involved in unleashing the "Ukraine crisis".

Russian terrorist involved in the separatist activities in Eastern Ukraine Igor Strelkov-Girkin (in military fatigues) and Russian fascist Aleksandr Dugin (in a black suit) are meeting their sponsor Konstantin Malofeev on Valaam (Russia) on 28 August 2014
As Austrian journalist Bernhard Odehnal reported, Malofeev recently convened in Vienna a secret meeting of Russian and European fascists and right-wing politicians such as Aleksandr Dugin (International Eurasian Movement, Russia), Marion Maréchal-Le Pen and Aymeric Chauprade (National Front, France), Heinz-Christian Strache and Johann Gudenus (FPÖ, Austria).

Chauprade was present at the WCF VIII in Moscow too and even sat in the presidium of the congress.

Presidium of the WCF VIII (left to right): Chief Rabbi of Russia Berel Lazar, Supreme Mufti of Russia Talgat Tajuddin, Aymeric Chauprade, Russian right-wing politician Yelena Mizulina, Konstantin Malofeev, Nataliya Yakunina and Vladimir Yakunin. 10 September 2014, Moscow
Natalia Yakunina
Presidium of the WCF VIII (left to right): Supreme Mufti of Russia Talgat Tajuddin, Aymeric Chauprade, Russian right-wing politician Yelena Mizulina, Russian Orthodox leader Vladimir (Kirill) Gundyaev, Nataliya Yakunina, Oleg Morozov, Vladimir Yakunin. 10 September 2014, Moscow

Also present at the congress was FPÖ's Johann Gudenus. He condemned Western sanctions against Russia that is waging war on Ukraine and talked about "the strong gay lobby in Europe" that "controls the mass media". According to Gudenus, the US, obviously, is behind the alleged attempts at destroying the traditional values in Europe.

Major Austrian political parties have criticised the message of Gudenus, and Federal spokesperson of the Austrian Green Party Eva Glawischnig urged the FPÖ's leader Heinz-Christian Strache to distance from Gudenus' speech at the congress: "The FPÖ chairman must decide whether he and his friends want to be in the pay of Moscow or on the European side". It looks, however, that Strache has already made a decision.

Johan Gudenus speaking on the gay lobby in Europe and the malicious US on 11 September 2014 in Moscow
In March 2014, Chauprade and Gudenus were among the "observers" at the illegal "referendum" in Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea first occupied and then annexed by Russia. Like many other far right politicians, each of them has a history of cooperating with the Russian authorities.

The congress was essentially a political event aimed at presenting (and reinforcing the image of) Russia as a bastion of family and traditional values. In the absence of progressive modernising tendencies, Russia needs to lay claim on at least some primitive idea to explain the presumable validity of its ambitions for global leadership.

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European far right politicians observe regional elections in Russia

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On Sunday, 14 September 2014, Russian authorities held "regional elections" in the annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Referring to the so called "Russian laws", the authorities said that there would be no international observers as they did not invite them for regional elections.

However, "international monitors" did "observe" regional elections in St. Petersburg on the same day, and it was not at all surprising to see familiar faces.

International electoral monitors meeting with acting governor of St. Petersburg Georgiy Poltavchenko. 1 - Piotr Luczak, 2 - Milan Šarapatka, 3 - Fabrizio Bertot, 4 - Frank Creyelman, 5 - Robert Stelzl, 6 - Ludovic de Danne, 7 - Johann Gudenus, 8 - Márton Gyöngyösi, 9 - Adrienn Szaniszló, 10 - Jan Penris. St. Petersburg, 15 September 2014. (I would be grateful for helping me in identifying other non-Russian people featured on this picture.)
 Below is almost the full list of individuals invited by the Russian authorities to monitor the elections in St. Petersburg. The list is divided in two tables: (1) those individuals whose participation in the electoral observation mission I can confirm, and (2) those individuals who were invited to observe the elections, but I cannot confirm their participation.

Table 1. Individuals who participated in the electoral observation mission.

NAME
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
AFFILIATION
Fabrizio Bertot
Italy
member of the right-wing Forza Italia
Frank Creyelman
Belgium
member of the extreme right Vlaams Belang
Ludovic de Danne
France
member of the radical right-wing populist National Front
Johann Gudenus
Austria
member of the radical right-wing populist Freedom Party of Austria
Márton Gyöngyösi
Hungary
member of right-wing extremist Jobbik
Piotr Luczak
Germany
member of left-wing Die Linke
Jan Penris
Belgium
member of the extreme right Vlaams Belang
Mateusz Piskorski
Poland
president of the European Centre for Geopolitical Analysis
Milan Šarapatka
Czech Republic
member of the right-wing populist Dawn of Direct Democracy
Ewald Stadler
Austria
leader of the Reform Conservatives
Robert Stelzl
Austria
member of the Reform Conservatives
Adrienn Szaniszló
Hungary
member of right-wing extremist Jobbik
Marian Szołucha
Poland
vice president of the European Centre for Geopolitical Analysis


Table 2. Individuals invited to monitor the elections; participation unconfirmed.

NAME
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
AFFILIATION
Hikmat Al-Sabty
Germany
left-wing Die Linke
Valerio Cignetti
Italy
Secretary General of the Alliance of European National Movements
Matthew Crosston
USA
Bellevue University
Angel Djambazki
Bulgaria
far right Bulgarian National Movement
Johannes Hübner
Austria
member of the radical right-wing populist Freedom Party of Austria
Adam Krzysztof Kępiński
Poland
member of the left-wing Democratic Left Alliance
Béla Kovács
Hungary
extreme right Jobbik

Mateusz Piskorski and Fabrizio Bertot as observers at the regional elections in St. Peterburg, 14 September 2014
As seen from the lists, the overwhelming majority of the monitors are EU-based far right politicians. At the same time, it is no longer surprising that German, allegedly left-wing Die Linke continues to collaborate with the European far right.

With the exception of Matthew Crosston, Angel Djambazki, Ludovic de Danne and Marian Szołucha, all the monitors who either took part in the electoral observation mission in St. Petersburg or were at least invited to take part in it were "observers" at the illegal "referendum" in the Crimea in March 2014. Djambazki, however, was invited to participate in the international conference called "Russia, Ukraine, New Russia: global problems and challenges" on 29-31 August 2014 in Yalta (I cannot confirm his participation, however).

Hence, this is almost a regular pool of individuals who are invited to legitimise controversial or unfair elections. Their coordinator this time has been Mateusz Piskorski, former member of neo-Nazi Niklot movement and former member of the far right Samooborona party. Since 2007, he has been the head of the European Centre for Geopolitical Analysis that specialises in legitimising controversial elections in Eastern Europe and Asia.

Mateusz Piskorski, coordinator of the electoral observation mission, at the meeting with Georgiy Poltavchenko. St. Petersburg, 15 September 2014
The results of the observation mission controlled by the Putin-friendly far right werepredictable:

Frank Creyelman: "The elections were transparent and well-organised. The elections were conducted to the highest European level [...]. We could not, although we tried, find any violations of the European standards. I want to stress that Belgium has much to learn from Russia".

Ludovic de Danne: "In comparison to Paris, the elections in St. Petersburg are better organised. We would like to communicate to all the members of the European parliament about the high level of the organisation and conduct of the elections in your city".

Johan Gudenus (who probably did not even leave Russia after the World Congress of Families in Moscow): "Democracy is splendid. But it does not have standards; it should take into account local peculiarities. We are satisfied with how prudently and efficiently the standards of democracy are interpreted in your country".

Johan Gudenus (left) shaking hands with Georgiy Poltavchenko. St. Petersburg, 15 September 2014
And here is one example how "prudently and efficiently the standards of democracy are interpreted" in Russia:


Gudenus would say that these were simply "local peculiarities".

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The "National-Bolshevik" alliance is again at work in the European Parliament

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On 16 September 2014, the European Parliament ratified the EU-Ukraine Association agreement, which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement. The Agreement will establish a deep political association and economic integration between the EU and Ukraine. 535 MEPs voted in favour of the ratification, 127 - against, 35 - abstained, and 54 - did not vote.

The analysis of the vote shows that the majority of the MEPs who voted against the ratification of the EU-Ukraine agreement are coming from the far right (46 MEPs), (far-)left (35 MEPs) and eurosceptic (30) political parties. This anti-European "National-Bolshevik" alliance manifested itself, in particular, during the vote on the European Parliament resolution "On Russian pressure on Eastern Partnership countries and in particular destabilisation of eastern Ukraine" that recognised "Russia’s acts of aggression as a grave violation of international law and its own international obligations".

As I predicted in April this year, the "National-Bolshevik" alliance has grown stronger in the newly elected European Parliament. In April, only 49 MEPs voted against the resolution "On Russian pressure", but now 127 MEPs voted against the EU-Ukraine agreement.

Here is a complete list of the MEPs who did not support the deep political association and economic integration between the EU and Ukraine.


Country/MEP
Party
Ideology
Austria


Barbara KAPPEL
Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs
radical right-wing populism
Georg MAYER
Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs
radical right-wing populism
Franz OBERMAYR
Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs
radical right-wing populism
Harald VILIMSKY
Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs
radical right-wing populism



Belgium


Gerolf ANNEMANS
Vlaams Belang
radical right-wing populism



Cyprus


Takis HADJIGEORGIOU
Progressive Party of Working People - Left - New Forces
communism
Neoklis SYLIKIOTIS
Progressive Party of Working People - Left - New Forces
communism



Czech Republic


Jan KELLER
Česká strana sociálně demokratická
social democracy
Kateřina KONEČNÁ
Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy
communism
Petr MACH
Strana svobodných občanů
euroscepticism
Jiří MAŠTÁLKA
Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy
communism
Miloslav RANSDORF
Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy
communism



Denmark


Rina Ronja KARI
Folkebevægelsen mod EU
euroscepticism



France


Louis ALIOT
Front national
radical right-wing populism
Marie-Christine ARNAUT
Front national
radical right-wing populism
Nicolas BAY
Front national
radical right-wing populism
Dominique BILDE
Front national
radical right-wing populism
Marie-Christine BOUTONNE
Front national
radical right-wing populism
Steeve BRIOIS
Front national
radical right-wing populism
Aymeric CHAUPRADE
Front national
radical right-wing populism
Mireille D'ORNANO
Front national
radical right-wing populism
Edouard FERRAND
Front national
radical right-wing populism
Sylvie GODDYN
Front national
radical right-wing populism
Bruno GOLLNISCH
Front national
radical right-wing populism
Jean-François JALKH
Front national
radical right-wing populism
Patrick LE HYARIC
Front de Gauche
communism
Jean-Marie LE PEN
Front national
radical right-wing populism
Marine LE PEN
Front national
radical right-wing populism
Gilles LEBRETON
Souveraineté, Indépendance et Libertés
euroscepticism
Philippe LOISEAU
Front national
radical right-wing populism
Dominique MARTIN
Front national
radical right-wing populism
Bernard MONOT
Front national
radical right-wing populism
Sophie MONTEL
Front national
radical right-wing populism
Jean-Luc MÉLENCHON
Front de Gauche
communism
Joëlle MÉLIN
Front national
radical right-wing populism
Younous OMARJEE
L'union pour les Outremer
left-wing radicalism
Florian PHILIPPOT
Front national
radical right-wing populism
Jean-Luc SCHAFFHAUSER
Rassemblement bleu Marine
radical right-wing populism
Mylène TROSZCZYNSKI
Front national
radical right-wing populism
Marie-Christine VERGIAT
Front de Gauche
communism



Germany


Klaus BUCHNER
Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei
conservatism
Fabio DE MASI
Die Linke
left-wing
Stefan ECK
Partei Mensch Umwelt Tierschutz
environmentalism
Cornelia ERNST
Die Linke
left-wing
Martina MICHELS
Die Linke
left-wing
Marcus PRETZELL
Alternative für Deutschland
euroscepticism
Helmut SCHOLZ
Die Linke
left-wing
Udo VOIGT
Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands
neo-Nazism
Beatrix von STORCH
Alternative für Deutschland
euroscepticism
Gabriele ZIMMER
Die Linke
left-wing



Greece


Kostas CHRYSOGONOS
Coalition of the Radical Left
left-wing radicalism
Georgios EPITIDEIOS
Popular Association – Golden Dawn
neo-Nazism
Lampros FOUNTOULIS
Popular Association – Golden Dawn
neo-Nazism
Emmanouil GLEZOS
Coalition of the Radical Left
left-wing radicalism
Georgios KATROUGKALOS
Coalition of the Radical Left
left-wing radicalism
Kostadinka KUNEVA
Coalition of the Radical Left
left-wing radicalism
Notis MARIAS
Independent Greeks
radical right-wing populism
Konstantinos PAPADAKIS
Communist Party of Greece
communism
Dimitrios PAPADIMOULIS
Coalition of the Radical Left
left-wing radicalism
Sofia SAKORAFA
Coalition of the Radical Left
left-wing radicalism
Eleytherios SYNADINOS
Popular Association – Golden Dawn
neo-Nazism
Sotirios ZARIANOPOULOS
Communist Party of Greece
communism



Hungary


Zoltán BALCZÓ
Jobbik
right-wing extremism
Krisztina MORVAI
Jobbik
right-wing extremism



Ireland


Lynn BOYLAN
Sinn Féin
social democracy
Matt CARTHY
Sinn Féin
social democracy
Liadh NÍ RIADA
Sinn Féin
social democracy



Italy


Mara BIZZOTTO
Lega Nord
radical right-wing populism
Mario BORGHEZIO
Lega Nord
radical right-wing populism
Gianluca BUONANNO
Lega Nord
radical right-wing populism
Lorenzo FONTANA
Lega Nord
radical right-wing populism
Eleonora FORENZA
Lista Tsipras-L'Altra Europa
social democracy
Curzio MALTESE
Lista Tsipras-L'Altra Europa
social democracy
Matteo SALVINI
Lega Nord
radical right-wing populism
Barbara SPINELLI
Lista Tsipras-L'Altra Europa
social democracy



Latvia


Tatjana ŽDANOKA
Latvijas Krievu savienība
social democracy



Netherlands


Marcel de GRAAFF
Partij voor de Vrijheid
radical right-wing populism
Dennis de JONG
Socialistische Partij
social democracy
Anja HAZEKAMP
Partij voor de Dieren
environmentalism
Hans JANSEN
Partij voor de Vrijheid
radical right-wing populism
Vicky MAEIJER
Partij voor de Vrijheid
radical right-wing populism
Anne-Marie MINEUR
Socialistische Partij
social democracy
Olaf STUGER
Partij voor de Vrijheid
radical right-wing populism



Poland


Robert Jarosław IWASZKIEWICZ
Nowa Prawica-Janusza Korwin-Mikke
euroscepticism
Janusz Ryszard KORWIN-MIKKE
Nowa Prawica-Janusza Korwin-Mikke
euroscepticism
Michał MARUSIK
Nowa Prawica-Janusza Korwin-Mikke
euroscepticism
Stanisław Józef ŻÓŁTEK
Nowa Prawica-Janusza Korwin-Mikke
euroscepticism



Portugal


João FERREIRA
Coligação Democrática Unitária
left-wing radicalism
António MARINHO E PINTO
Partido da Terra
conservatism
Marisa MATIAS
Bloco de Esquerda
left-wing radicalism
Miguel VIEGAS
Partido Comunista Português
communism
Inês Cristina ZUBER
Coligação Democrática Unitária
left-wing radicalism



Spain


Marina ALBIOL GUZMÁN
Izquierda Unida
communism
Javier COUSO PERMUY
Izquierda Unida
communism
Pablo ECHENIQUE
Podemos
left-wing
Pablo IGLESIAS
Podemos
left-wing
Iosu JUARISTI ABAUNZ
Euskal Herria Bildu
social democracy
Paloma LÓPEZ
Izquierda Unida
communism
Tere RODRIGUEZ-RUBIO VÁZQUEZ
Podemos
left-wing
Lidia SENRA RODRÍGUEZ
Alternativa galega de esquerda en Europa
left-wing nationalism
Lola SÁNCHEZ CALDENTEY
Podemos
left-wing
Ángela VALLINA
Izquierda Unida
communism



Sweden


Peter LUNDGREN
Sverigedemokraterna
radical right-wing populism
Kristina WINBERG
Sverigedemokraterna
radical right-wing populism



United Kingdom


John Stuart AGNEW
UKIP
euroscepticism
Tim AKER
UKIP
euroscepticism
Martina ANDERSON
Sinn Féin
social democracy
Jonathan ARNOTT
UKIP
euroscepticism
Janice ATKINSON
UKIP
euroscepticism
Amjad BASHIR
UKIP
euroscepticism
Louise BOURS
UKIP
euroscepticism
James CARVER
UKIP
euroscepticism
Jane COLLINS
UKIP
euroscepticism
Bill ETHERIDGE
UKIP
euroscepticism
Nigel FARAGE
UKIP
euroscepticism
Raymond FINCH
UKIP
euroscepticism
Nathan GILL
UKIP
euroscepticism
Roger HELMER
UKIP
euroscepticism
Mike HOOKEM
UKIP
euroscepticism
Diane JAMES
UKIP
euroscepticism
Paul NUTTALL
UKIP
euroscepticism
Patrick O'FLYNN
UKIP
euroscepticism
Margot PARKER
UKIP
euroscepticism
Julia REID
UKIP
euroscepticism
Jill SEYMOUR
UKIP
euroscepticism
Steven WOOLFE
UKIP
euroscepticism

Ukrainian intellectual was attacked by paramilitary right-wing thugs in Kyiv

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Here is an extremely unsettling message from Kyiv:
Vasyl Cherepanyn, lecturer at the National University ''Kyiv-Mohyla Academy'' and head of Visual Culture Research Center, was attacked on Kontraktova square in Kiev, next to the university were he works.

A group of unknown men dressed in camouflage paramilitary uniforms suddenly attacked Vasyl Cherepanyn in broad daylight in a crowded square in central Kyiv. The police was late to the scene, and the attackers were not arrested. Vasyl Cherepanyn received heavy injuries, including fractures of facial bones. He links this incident to his professional activity.


Vasyl Cherepanyn, PhD of Theory of Art, is a lecturer at the Cultural Studies Department at the National University ''Kyiv-Mohyla Academy''. He is the head of Visual Culture Research Center and Editor of the Political Critique journal. He is an organizer of numerous scientific conferences, public discussions and art exhibitions. Among the latest events, co-organized by Vasyl Cherepanyn, is the conference "Ukraine: Thinking Together", with the participation of Timothy Snyder, Ivan Krastev, Agnieszka Holland, Paul Bermann and other leading intellectuals, and also the series of events during the Open University of Maidan.

While the military aggression is carried out against Ukraine, aggressive young men in military uniforms carried out an unprecedentedly violent attack on the university lecturer in the center of Kyiv. During the attack, the thugs were accusing Vasyl Cherepanyn of being ‘a separatist’, which is totally absurd to anyone aware of his activities. These unfounded and absurd claims, along with accusations of being ‘a communist’, are more and more often used by aggressive ignorants who aim to impose their ideology of hatred upon Ukrainian society, and to suppress any manifestations of critical thought. We demand a quick investigation of this appalling attack. We also demand to investigate the activities of paramilitary groups that use the war in Ukraine as a pretext to justify their own misantropic views.
I know Vasyl personally and consider this outrageous attack on him, which has been most likely carried out by Ukrainian neo-Nazis, as an attack on the most intelligent and intellectual part of the Ukrainian society. Vasyl is known for his pro-Ukrainian, pro-revolutionary left-wing views, and, together, we took part in several events providing academic analysis of the Ukrainian revolution from social, political and cultural perspectives.

I join the VCRC in their demands to immediately investigate the shocking attack on Vasyl Cherepanyn and arrest all those responsible for this crime.

European far right team at the anti-Semitic conference in Tehran

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On 27 September - 1 October 2014, the Iranian authorities held its annual "New Horizon" conference that hosted more than thirty participants to discuss "Zionist 9/11 conspiracy" and "Israel lobbying" in different countries.

While the anti-Semitic nature of this annual conference is nothing new, it was "surprising" to see several participants of the conference in Tehran who are supportive of Vladimir Putin's allegedly anti-fascist regime in Russia.

MateuszPiskorski and Thierry Meyssan, Tehran, autumn 2014
Claudio Mutti doing the Quennelle salute in the courtyard of the former US Embassy in Tehran, autumn 2014
Leonid Savin and ManuelOchsenreiter, Tehran, autumn 2014
Leonid Savin and Manuel Ochsenreiter, Tehran, autumn 2014

Ukraine's parliamentary elections and the far right

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On the 26th of October 2014, Ukrainians voted at the early parliamentary elections. Ukraine currently has a mixed electoral system (50% under party lists and 50% under constituencies) with a 5% election threshold. Here are the results of the National Exit Poll 2014 (I mention only those parties who seem to be entering the parliament and the parties which can be termed as far right):


Petro Poroshenko Bloc
23.0
People’s Front
21.3
Samopomich
13.2
Opposition Bloc
7.6
Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko
6.4
Svoboda
6.3
Batkivshchyna
5.6
Right Sector
2.4
Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists
0.1


Since these are not official results, the following analysis is preliminary:

As I argued in February this year, popular support for the far right Svoboda party had dwindled already by the beginning of Euromaidan protests in Ukraine. Svoboda obtained 10.44% of the vote at the 2012 parliamentary elections, but in November 2013 only 5.1% of the voters would have cast a ballot for this party. Moreover, Svoboda failed to recover its lost support during the 2014 revolution in Ukraine, so only 5.6% of the voters would vote for the party in February 2014. At the early presidential election in May 2014, the leader of Svoboda Oleh Tyahybok obtained 1.16% of the vote.

Svoboda's relative failure to mobilise its former electorate can be attributed to the demise of former president Viktor Yanukovych's regime: Svoboda was successful in 2012 because it was considered an anti-Yanukovych party, so with Yanukovych ousted, almost half of Svoboda's electorate was gone too. Furthermore, in 2012, Svoboda was also considered almost the only "patriotic" party, but now all democratic parties are patriotic, so Svoboda has lost its "monopoly" on patriotism.

Svoboda's leader Oleh Tyahnybok probably facing hard times ahead

What should also be noted is that the decline of Svoboda is much deeper than the simple comparison of electoral results in 2012 and 2014 can demonstrate. In 2014, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and part of the Donbass region did not take part in the parliamentary elections as Crimea is now criminally annexed by Russia, while part of the Donbass region is under control of (pro-)Russian extremists. Int he past, these two regions voted heavily for Yanukovych's party and the misleadingly named Communist Party of Ukraine and, therefore, brought down the support for Svoboda on the national level. If citizens in Crimea and Donbass had been given a chance to freely vote in the 2014 parliamentary elections, Svoboda's results would have been even worse.

Where did Svoboda's former electorate go? I presume that more moderate voters went back to the national-democratic forces, such as the People’s Front or Samopomich. Part of Svoboda's former electorate apparently went to the Right Sector and Oleh Lyashko's Radical Party. The inclusion of these two parties into the far right category is tentative. As a political party, the Right Sector is ideologically quite different from the movement under the same name that was formed during the 2014 revolution; the party is less radical than the movement, so I suggest the term "national conservative" as a more relevant one. Lyashko's Radical Party is dangerously populist and a typical anti-establishment force. However, both the Right Sector and Lyashko's Radical Party have extreme right members, but they are a minority. In contrast to Lyashko's Radical Party, the Right Sector will not be able to enter the parliament, but its leader Dmytro Yarosh will most likely be elected in one of the single-member districts.

Dmytro Yarosh, leader of the Right Sector party and commander of the unit of the same name that was fighting against (pro-)Russian extremists in Eastern Ukraine

The People's Front led by prime minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk also involved extreme right candidates: Andriy Biletskiy, leader of the neo-Nazi Social-National Assembly and commander of the Azov regiment, and Vadym Troyan of the same affiliation, ran in single-member districts and were supported by the People's Front. At the time of writing, it is not clear whether Biletsky and Troyan have been elected.


Vadym Troyan of the Social-National Assembly/Azov regiment advertised on the web-site of the presumably democratic People's Front party

The veterans of the Ukrainian far right, the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, have failed again. I presume the aim of their participation in the elections is not about getting into the parliament; rather, it is about having official observers in the electoral commissions - sometimes in the past observers from fringe political forces provided "services" to interested parties, i.e. were involved in corrupt schemes.

To conclude this preliminary analysis, the Ukrainian far right forces do not appear to be as successful in the electoral terms as they were in 2012. Populism, however, is still a problem, while relatively large segments of the Ukrainian society fail to recognise the threat that populism poses to the consolidation of democracy in Ukraine.

Vladimir Zhirinovsky's contacts with the European far right in the Yeltsin era

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[This post is part of my ongoing research on the cooperation between post-Soviet Russia and the European/American far right. The fully referenced version of this post will appear in a published work, so all the links/footnotes/endnotes are deliberately omitted.]

In the Yeltsin era, the contacts between Russian politicians and the European/American far right were scarce. One could focus on four major areas of these contacts established by (1) Aleksandr Dugin, (2) Sergey Glazyev, (3) Pavel Tulaev, and (4) Vladimir Zhirinovsky.

Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the leader of the misleadingly named far right Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) tried to forge relationships with European radical right-wing parties already in the early 1990s. Eduard Limonov of the National-Bolshevik Party, while living in France, introduced Zhirinovsky, in autumn 1992, to Jean-Marie Le Pen, contemporary leader of the Front National (FN). Their meeting turned out to be beneficial to Zhirinovsky, as later the FN “provided logistical support [to the LDPR], including computers and fax machines, in short supply in Moscow at that time”.

Already during his first meeting with Le Pen, Zhirinovsky suggested establishing the International Centre of Right-wing Parties in Moscow and invited Le Pen to Russia’s capital. Le Pen, according to Limonov, “confined himself to commending the project”. In 1996, when Le Pen did eventually visit Moscow, Zhirinovsky spoke of founding a pan-European far right alliance again, under the name “Union of Right-wing Forces of Europe”. At that time this project was not implemented, but Zhirinovsky revived – and, to some extent, materialised – this idea after Vladimir Putin became Russian president.

Jean-Marie Le Pen and Vladimir Zhirinovsky in Moscow, 1996
Zhirinovsky’s another major foreign contact in the Yeltsin era was the far right Deutsche Volksunion (German People’s Union, DVU) led by now late Gerhard Frey, “the multi-millionaire media czar” who owned and published several newspapers, as well as being the main sponsor of his party. As early as 1992, Zhirinovsky and Frey spoke at each other’s party conventions. Moreover, following the staggering victory in the 1993 parliamentary elections – the LDPR obtained 22.92% of the votes – Zhirinovsky met with Frey again in Munich on his way to Austria where the leader of the LDPR spent a few days in the company of Edwin Neuwirth, “a local industrialist, Holocaust denier and proud former member of the Waffen SS”. In 1994, the LDPR and DVU signed a friendship accord.

According to Russian journalist Leonid Mlechin who spoke to one of the heads of the anti-extremist department of Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Frey provided financial support to the LDPR “in exchange for the promise to return the Kaliningrad oblast to Germany after Zhirinovsky became president of Russia”. Frey himself wrote that “if Mr. Zhirinovsky came to power in Russia he would negotiate with Germany about the return of the lost province of East Prussia”. Indeed, in his book The Last Thrust to the South, Zhirinovsky suggested restoring Germany to its 1937 borders. Zhirinovsky’s readiness to part with the Kaliningrad oblast seemed important to the DVU that insisted that Pomerania, Silesia and East Prussia be returned to Germany.

Vladimir Zhironovsky and Gerhard Frey in Munich, 1993
It seems viable to suggest that Zhirinovsky’s foreign relationships were not exclusively ideological, but also had a considerable element of financial interests. For example, in 1994, German authorities investigated whether Zhirinovsky was financed by the money of the defunct East German regime through his German contact Werner Girke who handled foreign financial holdings for the East German communists and was believed to have helped them covertly invest those funds in Western companies. In 1996, Italian police suspected Zhirinovsky of the involvement in the trade of nuclear materials that also involved Licio Gelli, a fascist activist since the 1930s and Grand Master of the Masonic lodge Propaganda Due (P2).

Zhirinovsky’s other far right contacts in the Yeltsin era included Zmago Jelinčič, the leader of the Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka (Slovenian National Party), and Vojislav Šešelj, the founder and leader of the Srpska Radikalna Stranka (Serbian Radical Party). Furthermore, in 1997, Zhirinovsky supported the separatist move of Umberto Bossi’s Lega Nord (Northern League) that attempted to create a state called “Padania” in Northern Italy. Bossi was excited about the support for his secessionist project received from “the third political force of the Russian parliament”, while Zhirinovsky took part in the opening sitting of the Padanian “parliament” and stated that, were he Russian president, he would recognise the independence of Padania.

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Fake monitors "observe" fake elections in Donbass

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The "Donetsk People's Republic" (DNR) and "Luhansk People's Republic" (LNR), which are officially considered terrorist organisations by the Ukrainian authorities, will hold "parliamentary elections" on Sunday, 2nd of November, on the territories occupied by them with the help of the Russian army.

These "elections" are widely considered illegal and illegitimate, and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon deplored"the planned holding by armed rebel groups in eastern Ukraine of their own “elections” on 2 November, in breach of the Constitution and national law" adding that "these “elections” will seriously undermine the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum, which need to be urgently implemented in full".

Nevertheless, the Kremlin is said to be willing to recognise these "elections", yet again completely dismissing the advice from the UN let alone defying the laws of Ukraine that Russia has invaded in February-March 2014. The DNR/LNR "elections" will not be recognised as legitimate either by the EU or the US that threaten Russia with further sanctions for undermining Ukraine's independence and sovereignty.

As it happenedbefore, the Kremlin will employ puppet "election monitors" that will "observe" and legitimise the "elections" held by the terrorists. Evidence suggests that two "election monitoring organisations" have been in charge of setting up the "election observation missions" for the DNR/LNR: the Eurasian Observatory of Democracy and Elections (EODE) run by Belgian fascist Luc Michel and the European Centre for Geopolitical Analysis (ECGA) run by Polish far right politician Mateusz Piskorski - both have been in the service of the Kremlin's foreign policy since 2005-2006.

(left to right ) The leader of the DNR terrorists Aleksandr Zakharchenko and Mateusz Piskorski, 1 November 2014, Donetsk
(left to right ) The leader of the DNR terrorists Aleksandr Zakharchenko and Fabrice Beaur (EODE / extreme right Parti communautaire national-européen), 1 November 2014, Donetsk

At the time of writing, the following names of international "observers" hired by the the EODE and ECGA the can be disclosed:


Name
Country
Political affiliation
Frank Abernathy
USA
???
Fabrice Beaur
Belgium
Parti communautaire national-européen (extreme right/National Bolshevik) / EODE
Fabrizio Bertot
Italy
Forza Italia (right-wing)
Frank Creyelman
Belgium
Vlaams Belang (extreme right)
Aleksey Didenko
Russia
Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (extreme right)
Vladimir Djukanovic
Serbia
Serbian Progressive Party (right-wing)
Márton Gyöngyösi
Hungary
Jobbik (extreme right)
Vladimir Krshlyanin
Serbia
Movement for Serbia (extreme right)
Georgios Lambroulis
Greece
Communist Party of Greece (extreme left/Stalinist)
Viliam Longauer
Slovakia
Union of Fighters against Fascism (...)
Alessandro Musolino
Italy
Forza Italia (right-wing)
Manuel Ochsenreiter
Germany
Zuerst! (far right journal)
Jean-Luc Schaffhauser
France
Rassemblement bleu Marine (radical right)
Ewald Stadler
Austria
Die Reformkonservativen (right-wing)
Magdalena Tasheva
Bulgaria
Ataka (extreme right)
Sotirios Zarianopoulos
Greece
Communist Party of Greece (extreme left/Stalinist)
Ladislav Zemánek
Czech Republic
No to Brussels – Popular Democracy (ultranationalist)

My analysis of the movements of these international "election monitors" shows that they arrived in Donetsk from Moscow via Rostov-on-Don. This means that they have all entered Ukraine illegally, as they have not passed the official Ukrainian border control. Thus, all of them can be persecuted for the crime of illegal border crossing.

The press conference of the international "observers" in Donbass, 1 November 2014. Second from the left is Alessandro Musolino, third is Ewald Stadler. Photo by Alec Luhn
According to Moscow-based journalist Alec Luhn, at the press conference in Donbass, the international "observers" suggested creating the Association for Security and Cooperation in Europe (ASCE), but then Stadler proposed the name "Agency for Security and Cooperation in Europe" (ASCE). The name obviously refers to the Oganisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), an international organisation that, in particular, monitors elections in different parts of the world. Since it provides objective and independent monitoring of elections and referenda, the OSCE is hated by the EODE and ECGA, as well as Russian authorities.

However, while constantly vilifying and trying to discredit the OSCE's observation missions, Russian state-controlled media intentionally present fake "election monitors" as members of the OSCE. For example, in March 2014, Russian TV channel "Rossiya 24" claimed that notorious fascist Michel was the "organiser of the OSCE observation mission" at the illegal "referendum" in Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea that Russia annexed afterwards.

Belgian fascist Luc Michel, the head of the EODE, in Crimea. The caption reads: "Organiser of the OSCE observation mission in Crimea"
In the same vein, on the 1st of November, Russia's major disinformation source, RIA Novosti claimed that OSCE monitors were present at polling stations controlled by the DNR/LNR terrorists. The OSCE promptly responded:

This imposturous presentation of Belgian fascist Luc Michel, to the Russian-speaking audience, as the "organiser of the OSCE observation mission" and frequent references to the OSCE monitors allegedly present at dubious "elections" reveal the high status value of the OSCE even in the generally anti-Western context of today's Russia.

The "elections" planned for the 2nd of November may be a start of a new offensive of the DNR/LNR extremists against the Ukrainian forces. There is a non-zero chance of a false flag operation against either the "observers" or people at "polling stations" that would be a pretext of such an offensive. Someone may be killed by the (pro-)Russian extremists dressed in uniforms of Ukrainian forces to discredit Ukraine and/or divert the international attention from the illegitimate "elections" to the killing(s) of "election observers" or "voters". The chances are low, but such a development cannot be ruled out.

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Helping international "observers" see armed men at "polling stations" in the Donbass

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Graham Phillips, a controversial British reporter for the Kremlin's disinformation service Russia Today, has interviewed Austrian right-wing politician Ewald Stadler, who is one of the "observers" at "elections" in the Donbass.


According to Stadler, "there is no pressure to the people. Soldiers and people with guns are outside, not inside. Everybody can vote here free".

OK, so Stadler does not see a man in military fatigues standing behind him. So let's help Stadler see something else, shall we?


Photo by Novaya Gazeta

Photo by Oleksiy Matsuka
Photo by RIA Novosti
Photo by Komsomolskaya Pravda
Photo by Associated Press
Photo by EPA

Right, according to Stadler, there are no armed men "inside" polling stations. This may actually be true: there are no polling stations in the Donbass because there are no elections there.

And here is a good example of what armed men are doing in order to provide safety of the "voters" and ensure the fairness of the "elections":

International "observers": Moscow - Rostov - Donetsk

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International fake observers of the fake elections in the Donbass arrived in Moscow on the 31st of October and checked in the 5-star Metropol Hotel. They had a late dinner at the hotel restaurant and some of them went for a walk to the Red Square:

Alessandro Bertoldi, member of Forza Italia and "observer" of the terrorist "elections", Moscow, 31 October 2014

Vladimir Djukanovic, member of the Serbian Progressive Party and "observer" of the terrorist "elections", Moscow, 31 October 2014
Those "observers" who would go illegally to Eastern Ukraine, took a morning flight from Moscow to Rostov-on-Don on the 1st of November and then travelled by bus from there to the Russian town of Kuybyshevo, right on the Russia-Ukraine border.

Two possible ways of getting from Rostov-on-Don to Kuybyshevo
The "observers" arriving to the Russia-Ukraine border in Kuybyshevo
At the border, (pro-)Russian extremists put armed escorts into the buses of "observers" and then they crossed the border. None of them passed any official Ukrainian border control.

(Pro-)Russian extremists' armed escort on the way from Kuybyshevo to Donetsk
They arrived in Donetsk and checked in the Ramada Hotel.

International "observers" and terrorists of the "Donetsk People's Republic" at the Ramada Hotel, Donetsk, 1 November 2014
US "observer" Srđa Trifković's room at the Ramada Hotel, Donetsk
On the same day, the "observers" were introduced to the leadership of the terrorist organisation "Donetsk People's Republic" and issued with "international observer" cards.

Member of the extreme right Ataka party Georgi Sengalevich's card of an international "observer"
Some of them met with French/Serbian Eurasianist fighters:

Manuel Ochsenreiter, editor of the far right Zuerst! journal (far left), and Dragana Trifkovic, director of the Belgrade Centre of Strategic Research (far right), with French/Serbian Eurasianists fighting against Ukrainians in Eastern Ukraine
On the 2nd of November, international "observers" began their work of "legitimising"illegal, fake elections held by (pro-)Russian extremists. Not all of them did their work in Ukraine, however. Adrienn Szaniszló of the extreme right Jobbik party, for example, stayed in the Rostov region to observe the "elections" there.

Adrienn Szaniszló (in the centre) at the "polling station" in the Rostov region, Russia, 2 November 2014

Russian extreme right White Rex organisation engaged in training of British neo-Nazi thugs

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In a revealing article for The Daily Sun, Scott Hesketh and Colin Cortbus write about training camps in Wales where neo-Nazi thugs "are being drilled in unarmed combat and fighting using knives and assault rifles". According to the authors, anti-terror police are monitoring the activities of the training camps which - under the leadership of fitness instructor and author Craig Fraser - might be used "to prepare for a wave of anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic attacks".

Moreover, the authors mention that neo-Nazi thugs were "also put through fitness ­sessions by trainers from ­Russian neo-Nazi group White Rex". Since there is not much information on White Rex available in English language, I decided to "introduce" the Anglophone audience to this movement. (I am grateful to the Moscow-based Sova Centre for Information and Analysis, the most important Russian NGO that conducts research on ultranationalism, racism and political radicalism in Russia, for the information they have provided).

Denis Nikitin, founder and head of White Rex

White Rex is many things. First of all, it is a clothing brand established by Denis Nikitin that produces t-shirts, hoodies and accessories with (sometimes disguised) fascist symbols.

Mens "Zero Tolerance" t-shirt. Note the image that represents a combination of a swastika and a black sun
Ladies "Bombs 88" t-shirt. "88" stands for "Heil Hitler"
Second, White Rex is actively engaged in organising mixed martial arts (MMA) tournaments in Russia and in Europe. It is, perhaps, through this particular activity that fighters affiliated with White Rex provide fitness ­sessions to British neo-Nazis at training camps in Wales. In 2013, White Rex organisied a MMA tournament in Rome; one of its guests was Erich Priebke, a convicted war criminal and former SS Hauptsturmführer who died later that year.

One of White Rex's MMA tournaments was called "The Birth of a Nation", a reference to the title of D.W. Griffith's racist film (originally called The Clansman) that was released in 1915
Third, White Rex is a movement that propagates neo-Nazi and racist ideas among Russian youth. According to the doctrine of White Rex,
White peoples of Europe, falling to onslaught of propaganda of alien values, lost the spirit of a path-breaker, the spirit of a fighter, the Spirit of a Warrior! One of the main objectives of White Rex is to revive this spirit. Modern society brings up philistines and consumers; yet we want to see WARRIORS - people who are strong morally and physically.
White Rex also promotes, and (co-)organises gigs of, White Power bands such as Moshpit, Brainwash, Prezumptsiya nevinovnosti (Assumption of Innocence), and, especially You Must Murder.

You Must Murder t-shirts designed by White Rex

Among activists who popularise White Rex in Russia and elsewhere one can name Roman Zentsov, the leader of the extreme right Soprotivlenie (Resistance) group. White Rex is also closely cooperating with Sergey Badyuk, a former KGB/FSB operative who became a businessman in the 1990s, but still provides training to the special forces of Russia's Main Intelligence Directorate.

British anti-terror police and the Home Office may want to keep a close watch on White Rex and the individuals mentioned in this article.


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Russians involved in the fake elections in eastern Ukraine

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According to the article "Ukraine Tensions Rise as U.S., EU Weigh More Sanctions" that was published by Bloomberg on 13 November 2014, officials from the EU and U.S. meeting in Brussels "will weigh further sanctions against Russia’s economy and Ukrainian separatists, after the reported movement of tanks, artillery and combat troops into eastern Ukraine".

Moreover, "the likeliest first step, they said, is to blacklist Ukrainian separatists and Russians involved in the Nov. 2 elections in eastern regions, which the Ukrainian government considers illegitimate".

I have already posted the list of "election monitors" that travelled to Eastern Ukraine (illegally) and to neighbouring Russian regions to "observe"fake elections for the "Donetsk People's Republic" and "Luhansk People's Republic". The list, to which I refer, is not complete, but this is the most complete list of fake "observers" available today. In this post, I will provide more information on the Russians who were involved in organising the "observation mission" in the Donbass and participated in it.

Who organised the "observation mission"?

From the Russian side, the main group that was involved in organising the "observation mission" is the Moscow-based "Civic Control" Association. "Civic Control" is what can be called a "GONGO", i.e. a "government organised non-governmental organisation", as the groups that compose this association are loyal to the Kremlin, while the key figures in the management of the association are members of – or, at least, closely associated with – the Russian parliament and the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation.

The co-chair of the "Civic Control", who was directly involved in organising the "observation mission", is Aleksandr Brod, director of the "Moscow Bureau for Human Rights". He also participated in the "observation mission" himself.

Aleksandr Semyonovich Brod (Александр Семенович Брод), born on 19 August 1969.

Georgiy Fyodorov, executive director of "Civic Control", was also involved in organising the "observation mission", although I cannot confirm that he travelled to the Donbass himself.

Georgiy Vladimirovich Fyodorov (Георгий Владимирович Фeдоров), born on 7 May 1973.
A member of the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation

Who participated in the "observation mission"?

Apart from Brod, the following Russian citizens took part in the "observation mission" in Eastern Ukraine:

Mikhail Vasilievich Bryachak (Михаил Васильевич Брячак), born on 6 April 1957.
MP, a member of the Just Russia (Spravedlivaya Rossiya) parliamentary group

Aleksey Nikolaevich Didenko (Алексей Николаевич Диденко), born on 30 March 1983.
MP, a member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia parliamentary group

Nikolay Vasilievich Kolomeytsev (Николай Васильевич Коломейцев), born on 1 September 1956.
MP, a member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation parliamentary group

Oleg Vladimirovich Pakholkov (Олег Владимирович Пахолков), born on 23 September 1971.
MP, a member of the Just Russia (Spravedlivaya Rossiya) parliamentary group

Vladimir Romanovich Rodin (Владимир Романович Родин), born on 12 January 1953.
MP, a member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation parliamentary group

Leonid Eduardovich Slutskiy (Леонид Эдуардович Слуцкий), born on 4 January 1968.
MP, a member of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia parliamentary group

Galina Valentinovna Yartseva (Галина Валентиновна Ярцева), born on 25 July 1963.
Editor of Russkiy Karavan

Aleksandr Andreevich Yushchenko (Александр Андреевич Ющенко), born on 19 November 1969.
A member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation

Aleksey Aleksandrovich Zhuravlyov (Алексей Александрович Журавлев), born on 30 June 1962.
MP, chair of the Motherland (Rodina) party, a member of the United Russia parliamentary group

EU and US officials who consider further sanctions against Russia may be interested in the above-listed individuals.

The French far right secure a €9m loan from a Russian bank close to Putin

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Writing for Mediapart, Marine Turchi reveals that the far right French Front National (FN) has secured, already in September this year, a 9 million Euros loan from the First Czech-Russian Bank (FCRB). The party led by Marine Le Pen has already received 2 million Euros. The information on the loan to the FN, according to Mediapart, has been confirmed by a member of the FN's political bureau. This development supports my earlier argument that "European right-wing extremists seem to benefit financially from their cooperation with the Kremlin".

As the FN's treasurer Wallerand de Saint-Just explained, the party had been trying to borrow money from a number of French, European and US banks, but was unsuccessful. Eventually, the FCRB proved to be more sympathetic to the French far right cause. "Why not a Russian bank?", asked Christian Bouchet, FN's officer in Loire-Atlantique, French publisher of Russian fascistAleksandr Dugin and former leader of the National Bolshevik Nouvelle résistance group. "Money does not stink", he added, referring to Roman Emperor Vespasian's justification for a tax on the distribution of urine from public urinals in Rome.

Mediapart names several individuals from the French and Russian sides who might be involved in mediating between the FN and the FCRB.

A member of Le Rassemblement bleu MarineJean-Luc Schaffhauser, whom I already mentionedtwice in this blog, might have introduced Marine Le Pen, during her confidential trip to Moscow in February 2014, to Alexander Babakov, former leader of the far right Rodina party and Vladimir Putin's envoy for engaging with Russian organisations abroad. Following this meeting, according to Mediapart, the NF's leader might have met with Putin himself.

While I admit the possibility of Schaffhauser's and Babakov's mediation between Le Pen and Putin, I doubt that Le Pen really needed assistance from either Schaffhauser or Babakov: already in June 2013, she met with the Russian parliament chairman Sergey Naryshkin and deputy prime minister (and former leader of Rodina) Dmitry Rogozin who were in position to introduce her to Putin.

Marine Le Pen in Moscow, June 2013
It is true, of course, that the cooperation between representatives of the Russian regime and the French far right has expanded in the recent months. In particular, Aymeric Chauprade, adviser to Le Pen on geopolitical issues "observed" the illegal "referendum" in Crimea and took part in an anti-LGBT gathering in Moscow; at the end of May this year, Chauprade and Marion Maréchal-Le Pen participated in the secret meeting of European far right activists in Vienna where they met with Dugin, Russian ultranationalist artist Ilya Glazunov, and Russian right-wing businessman Konstantin Malofeev; in November, Jean-Luc Schaffhauser"observed"the fake "elections" in East Ukrainian regions occupied and terrorised by (pro-)Russian right-wing extremists.

(left to right) Darya Dugina, daughter of Aleksandr Dugin, and Marion Maréchal-Le Pen, niece of Marine Le Pen and granddaughter of Jean-Marie Le Pen, in France, May or June 2014

Turchi's investigation is an invaluable contribution to the discussion of the cooperation between Putin's Russia and the European far right, yet it leaves open the question as to what links the FCRB to the Russian authorities. The FCRB has an interesting history that may shed light on this question.

It was founded in 1996 with the assistance of the now-defunct Czech IPB bank, that - as Jiri Kominek writing for The Jamestown Foundationasserts - "was a legendary nexus of asset stripping and money laundering" and "often accused of illegally funding [...] the two largest and most influential parties in the country".

The original objective of the FCRB was "to service foreign trade turnover and investment projects in Russia and the Czech Republic". Until 2002, its charter capital belonged to Czech companies and the bank itself was marginal in Russia. However, at the end of 2002, the bank doubled its charter capital thanks to the investments of Stroytransgaz, a Russian engineering construction company (Mediapart correctly links the FCRB to this company), and, shortly afterwards, Roman Popov (head of Stroytransgaz's financial resources directorate in 1992-2002) was appointed chairman of the board of the FCRB. Stroytransgaz kept increasing the bank's charter capital and, according to Vedomosti, Stroytransgaz owned 94,5% of the FCRB's charter capital already by summer 2003.

In 2003, the head office of the bank moved from the Czech Republic to Russia. However, the bank still operated in the Czech Republic and, in 2009, the Czech BIS security service and UZSI foreign intelligence service expressed their concern that the FCRB"could have ties to Russian intelligence, or organised crime elements, which given the current state of affairs in Russia often makes it difficult to distinguish between the two".

The majority of the shares of Stroytransgaz is owned by companies and holdings that belong to Gennadiy Timchenko, a major Russian businessman from Putin's inner circle. According to The Wall Street Journal, US prosecutors have recently "launched a money-laundering investigation" of the activities of Timchenko and Gunvor Group Ltd. that Timchenko co-founded in 2000. As the same source argues, "US officials have previously said that Mr. Putin has investments in Gunvor". Naturally, the US have also imposed sanctions on Timchenko and Stroytransgaz, in response to Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and its ongoing aggression in Eastern Ukraine.

Russia and US sanctions. Chart by BBC

The bottom line here is that the FN has received a loan from a company that is very closely linked to Putin and is owned by an individual under the US sanctions. This seems to retrospectively "justify" the FN's pro-Putin stances and its blatant anti-Americanism.

Yet there are more links between Timchenko and French representatives of political and business circles than the story about the loan to the FN can reveal. One example is that, in 2011, Timchenko was elected chairman of the Economic Council of the Franco-Russian Chamber of Commerce (CCIFR), an important tool of the Kremlin's "soft power" in France. (In 2013, Timchenko shared chairmanship of the Economic Council with Total's CEO Christophe de Margerie, but the latter was killed in an aircraft crash in Moscow on 20 October 2014, so now Timchenko apparently remains the only chairman of the CCIFR's Economic Council.)

Gennadiy Timchenko

The same day that Timchenko was elected chairman of the CCIFR's Economic Council, the Franco-Russian Observo analytical centre was established to provide analysis of Russian and French realities" for political and business elites of the two countries. The Observo analytical centre is headed by Arnaud Dubien, a research associate of the Institute for International and Strategic Relations (IRIS). Dubiendefendsthe (currently suspended) sale of two French Mistral helicopter carriers to Russia - the sale that violates the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. By undermining the international law, illegally occupying regions of Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), annexing Ukrainian territories (Crimea), waging the war against Ukraine in the Eastern regions of this country and supporting pro-Russian right-wing terrorists there, Russia clearly violates at least two criteria determined by the EU Council with regard to the arms sale by the EU member states:
Criterion Four
Preservation of regional peace, security and stability
Member States will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed export aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim

Criterion Six
The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law
The most vocal supporters of the delivery of the Mistrals to Russia are, quite expectedly, members of the FN. Local FN members in Saint-Nazaire, where the Mistrals are based, including Gauthier Bouchet (son of Christian Bouchet), Jean-Claude Blanchard and Stéphanie Sutter, have even set up a tiny group of supporters called "Mistral, gagnons!" that is vigorously lobbying for the Mistral deal with Russia and, therefore, its aggressive agenda in Europe.

(left to right) Stéphanie Sutter, Gauthier Bouchet and Jean-Claude Blanchard in Saint-Nazaire, November 2014
Marine Turchi's important piece for Mediapart concludes with a note that French investigators have already launched an inquiry into the funding sources of the FN. We can only hope that similar initiatives are undertaken in other European countries too, especially in Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria.

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Russian fascist Aleksandr Dugin gathering intelligence on the French military

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A report written by Russian fascist Aleksandr Dugin on 17 December 2013 (and published by the Anonymous International) suggests that he has been trying to gather intelligence on the French military circles.

In his report, Dugin describes a closed meeting of the French association "Civisme Défense Armée Nation" (Citizenship, Defense, Army, Nation, CiDAN) that took place at the Klingenthal castle near Strasbourg on 2-5 December 2013. CiDAN was established in 1999 by Admiral Pierre Lacoste, and, as they describe themselves, the association is guided by the "modern vision of patriotism and Europe", and promotes "devotion to the community" and contacts between civil society and the military. Its leadership largely consists of retired or reserve officers, and its president is Lieutenant Colonel Jacques Sonnet.


According to Dugin, the following themes were discussed at the meeting:

1. Preparations for a new French military intervention in one of the African countries, and the condition of the French military in Mali.

2. European interests in Syria. Dugin says that the discussants cautiously supported Russian president Vladimir Putin and cautiously criticised the US and French president François Hollande.

3. Russia and the Eurasian Union. Reports presented by Dugin and Michel Grimard of the Rassemblement pour l'Organisation de l'Unité Européenne (Rally for the Oranisation of the European Unity) who supported the Eurasian Union.

4. China and the US: cyber warfare, strategy, likelihood of conflict.

5. Organised crime, mafia and terrorism in Europe.

Aleksandr Dugin (second from the right), speaking at the conference "La Voie Eurasiste" (The Eurasian way) in Paris, 25 May 2013

Dugin stresses that "the French military are highly critical towards the US, NATO and the policies of Hollande and [Nicolas] Sarkozy". In Putin and Russia they allegedly see "an exemplary defence of sovereignty". According to Dugin, they are ready to cooperate with Russia and his neo-Eurasianist movement, "in which they see the leading intellectual force" of Russia. Dugin concludes that the organising committee of CiDAN is led by people of "anti-Atlanticist, anti-American and partially pro-Russian orientation".

How cronyism exploits Ukrainian neo-Nazis

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Ukraine’s early presidential and parliamentary elections earlier this year proved to be disastrous for the Ukrainian party-political far right.

Oleh Tyahnybok, the leader of the All-Ukrainian Union “Freedom” (Svoboda), obtained 1.16% of the vote in the presidential election, while his party secured only 4.71% of the vote in the parliamentary election and, eventually, failed to pass the 5% electoral threshold and enter the parliament. In comparison, Svoboda obtained 10.44% of the votes in 2012 and formed the first ever far right parliamentary group in Ukraine’s history. Dmytro Yarosh, the leader of the Right Sector, obtained 0.70% in the presidential election, and 1.80% of the voters supported his party in the parliamentary election.

However, the electoral failure of Svoboda and the Right Sector did not mark “the end of history” of the Ukrainian far right, and some other developments proved to be much more problematic. One of these developments is the rise of the previously obscure neo-Nazi organisation “Patriot of Ukraine” (PU) led by Andriy Bilets’ky.

Neo-Nazi leader Andriy Bilets'ky. Kharkiv, several years ago
Like some other leaders of the PU, Bilets’ky did not take part in the 2014 revolution, as he had been in jail since the end of 2011. Bilets’ky and his associates were released – as “political prisoners” – only after the revolution. In May, the PU formed a core of the Azov battalion, a volunteer detachment governed by the Ministry of Interior headed by Arsen Avakov.

A member of Yatsenyuk’s People’s Front party, Avakov promoted the Azov battalion and granted the rank of police Lieutenant Colonel to its commander Bilets’ky in August. The People’s Front also brought Bilets’ky into the military council of the party and apparently planned to officially support his candidacy in the parliamentary election, but, due to the opposition to such a move from the Ukrainian expert community and representatives of national minorities, the People’s Front was forced to re-think its decision. However, the People’s Front, in particular Avakov and his advisor Anton Gerashchenko, still supported Bilets’ky unofficially, and he was elected into the parliament in a single-member district in Kyiv. After the elections, Avakov appointed Vadym Troyan, deputy commander of the Azov battalion and a top member of the PU, as head of the Kyiv region police.

At a gathering of the Azov battalion. Kyiv, 2014

Why does the Ukrainian Ministry of Interior promote the leaders of the neo-Nazi organisation? Its ideology can hardly explain these developments, as neither Avakov nor Gerashchenko is a neo-Nazi. The explanation seems to lie in the past and has to do with a sinister legacy of cronyism.

Avakov, Bilets’ky and Troyan are coming from the Kharkiv region and have known each other at least since 2009-2010, when Avakov was still a governor of the Kharkiv region. In Kharkiv, the PU was involved in questionable activities, ranging from attacks on Vietnamese merchants to seizures of businesses. In 2010, the PU activists headed by Troyan seized four dozens of news stalls in Kharkiv in favour of, according to the media reports, a company of Andriy Liphans’ky. The latter was a business partner of Avakov and headed the board of media and information of the Kharkiv region during Avakov’s governance. Media reports also suggested that Liphans’ky rented a gym for training of the PU activists. In their turn, the PU activists provided security for the Kharkiv protests of the Bloc of Yuliya Tymoshenko (BYuT) – at that time Avakov headed that the regional office of the BYuT. Furthermore, a leader of the Kharkiv football hooligans who was close to the PU took part in Avakov’s mayoral campaign in 2010.

Today’s involvement of the PU leaders in Ukrainian police seems to be driven by Avakov’s trust in the organisation that he worked with in the past. Avakov also seems to believe in the personal loyalty of the PU-led Azov battalion and may use them as his “private army” for business or political reasons.

Andriy Bilets'ky and Minister of Interior Arsen Avakov, 2014

The problematic relationship between the Ministry of Inferior and the neo-Nazis is undermining the credibility of the newly formed Ukrainian government internationally and domestically.

It was most likely Avakov who suggested to Poroshenko to grant Ukrainian citizenship to Belarusian fighter of the Azov battalion Sergey Korotkikh who had been involved in the neo-Nazi movements in Belarus and Russia since the late 1990s. It is highly unlikely that Avakov mentioned to Poroshenko the background of a new Ukrainian citizen.

Moreover, under Avakov, the police in Kyiv have already proved unable or unwilling to investigate a number of hate crimes. In July, far right thugs – not necessarily associated with the PU – attacked four black people in the underground, a gay club and a Jewish student by a synagogue. The police initiated two criminal cases, but nobody has been prosecuted so far. In September, the head of the Visual Culture Research Centre Vasyl Cherepanyn was beaten apparently by far right activists, but the police failed to investigate the attack too.

It seems viable to suggest that, under Troyan as head of the Kyiv region police, investigations into hate crimes will hardly be efficient, while the persistent traditions of cronyism will unlikely contribute to the building of a strong democracy.

Originally published in German in Zeit Online.

Center for Eurasian Strategic Intelligence, a fraudulent "hawkish" think tank

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Readers of this blog may have heard of the Center for Eurasian Strategic Intelligence (CESI) that seems to promote a "hawkish" view on Russia's foreign policy. In his Twitter, Edward Lucas has recently raised doubts about the authenticity of this organisation, and, as I found out, for a good reason. Let's have a closer look at CESI.

(Note that I will not be discussing their analyses, as they tendto plagiarisefrom other sources.)

Major resources of CESI:
- Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/eurasianintelligence. Registered on 18 March 2014.
- Website: http://eurasianintelligence.org. Registered on 18 July 2014.
- YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/user/eurasianintelligence/ Registered on 6 August 2014.
- Twitter: https://twitter.com/EurasianIntel. Date of registration unknown, first tweet on 12 August 2014.

(The first two dates: This may be just a coincidence, but on 18 March 2014, "Republic of Crimea" and the Russian Federation signed a "treaty on accession of the republic of Crimea to Russia", and, on 17 July 2014, the Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down by (pro-)Russian right-wing extremists in Eastern Ukraine).

According to their website, CESI "provides analysis and surveys of political, economic and security processes in Eurasia region. CESI was founded in 2014 with a focus on Russian policy of expansion and military aggression in the Eastern Europe". It lists the following individuals involved in the workings of the organisation:

- William Fowler, Chairman and CEO
- Alex Kraus, Chief Analyst
- Kelly Hunt, Chief Operating Officer
- Steven J. Hudson, Chief Geopolitical Analyst
- David Carpenter, Chief Economy Analyst
- Gareth McCallister, Jr., Information Supervisor

As Edward Lucas pointed out, William Fowler's profile picture in his Facebook is a picture of an anonymous "old businessman with gray hair and glasses".

A screenshot from William Fowler's Facebook
An image search on Google
Thus, Fowler's Facebook is, at the very least, misleading. Moreover, it is unlikely registered to any "William Fowler" at all. Most likely, the real name of the registrant begins with a "t" and ends with a "y":


So, is "William Fowler" a real person? I doubt it. And I even doubt that anyone mentioned as a staff member of CESI is a real person. (I will not go into detail with all of them, but I would invite the interested readers to do so.)

The only member of CESI with a "face" is Alex Kraus.

A screenshot from one of CESI's videos
Alex Kraus is the only person from CESI who appears in their videos. His native language is not English and he pronounces Russian names with a Slavic (i.e. close to Russian, yet not exactly Russian) accent. Kraus may be a Czech; at least he mentions his proficiency in the Czech language on his LinkedIn page.

A screenshot from Alex Kraus' LinkedIn page. Note that his profile photo is not professional, but rather a screenshot from a CESI's video uploaded on YouTube on 12 August 2014, the date when CESI posted its first Tweet
CESI's website is registered in the name of Abigail Kalopong, and she is probably the most interesting person in the whole story.

According to her LinkedIn page, she is a "nominal director" of CESI:

A screenshot from Abigail Kalopong's LinkedIn page
Note that "nominal" is a key word in the story.

She is a national and resident of Vanuatu, and appears to be a real person. An e-mail account registered in her name is linked to a Twitter account of CESI -

- while her Gmail account (abigail.kalopong@gmail.com) is linked to CESI's official e-mail address (office@eurasianintelligence.org):

However, the real Kalopong residing in Vanuatu may not be in control of the Gmail account registered in her name.

Another interesting thing about Abigail Kalopong is that, apart from being a "nominal director" of CESI, she is currently a director of 59 companies!


If you add companies registered in the name of Abigail Kalopung, you will have 86 companies in total.



Almost all her companies are registered with one and the same address (which is actually a mailbox): Office 11, 43 Bedford Street, London, United Kingdom, WC2E 9HA. If one looks at the companies that are registered with this address, they will see that all these companies are "offshore-type" businesses. Moreover, those are largely connected to companies in Russia and Kazakhstan, as well as those associated with the regime of former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych and other Ukrainian businessmen.

Just a few examples concerning the Ukrainian connections:

- Kalopung's Fineberg Limited seems to own a yacht named "First Wave" that apparently belongs to Serhiy Arbuzov, chairman of the National Bank of Ukraine and, later, interim prime minister under Yanukovych;
- Kalopong's Helix Capital Investments Ltd. is a typical pyramid scheme that operatesin Ukraine;
- Kalopong even "set up" a company named "Roshen UK Limited", most likely to "squat" the name of the Ukrainian company Roshen in the UK;
- around 75% of the Zaporizhia Automobile Building Plant is allegedly owned by three British companies, of which two aredirected by the same Kalopong, but, eventually, are most likely owned by some Ukrainian or Russian businessmen.

It should now be clear that Kalopong/Kalopung is simply a front-woman whose name is used to conceal real owners of the businesses she allegedly manages.

The same is the case for the "think-tank" CESI. What I do not know is who is the ultimate owner of CESI, but most likely they are either Ukrainian(s) or Russian(s).

At the first glance, the website of CESI seems to be anti-Putin, as it presumably aims to show the threats that Putin's regime poses to Western democracies. However, a more nuanced analysis would probably show that the aims of CESI are very different. To fully understand these objectives, I suggest reading The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money by Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss. In this report, the authors, in particular, argue that one of the strategies of the Kremlin's foreign policy is a reversal of "soft power": Putin's aim is not to be attractive, but to present himself as a bogeyman.

CESI pictures Russia as an immediate threat to the West, but it does so in a manner that exaggerates the threat in order to discourage the West from opposing the aggressive politics of Moscow and impel to appease Putin's Russia at all costs.

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A Putin in the heart of Europe?

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Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s declaration in summer 2014 that his government was going “to build an illiberal nation state” was far from a revelation. Rather, it was a statement of a long-acknowledged fact: Orbán’s Hungary is increasingly becoming a right-wing authoritarian kleptocracy bearing a growing resemblanceto Vladimir Putin’s Russia.

The pro-Putin United Russia party formed its first parliamentary majority after the 2003 elections. Putin took this opportunity to modify the electoral law to marginalise minor parties in the next elections and strengthen the major parties and, in particular, the United Russia. These changes helped the United Russia to win enough seats in the 2007 parliamentary elections to form a constitutional majority. Since Orbán’s party Fidesz returned to power after the 2010 parliamentary elections, he has moved swiftly to consolidate it. Amid the popular disappointment with the previous, Socialist-led government that failed to effectively tackle the 2008 financial crisis, Fidesz and its minor coalition partner Christian Democratic People’s Party secured two-thirds of the seats in the parliament. Forming a parliamentary majority allowed them to modify the country’s constitution, including the electoral law, in 2012. The electoral reform helped Orbán retain the constitutional majority after the 2014 elections.

Viktor Orbán and Vladimir Putin
The modification of the electoral laws to the benefit of Fidesz or the United Russia was not the only instrument of seizing and maintaining power. Three steps were crucial in this process. The first step was to take control over the judiciary aiming to use it as a tool of political pressure. In Putin’s Russia, judicial independence was undermined by Presidential Administration and Security Services; according to Constitutional Court Judge Vladimir Yaroslavtsev, judiciary in Russia may be independent when addressing minor issues but will conform to the authorities in politically sensitive cases. In Orbán’s Hungary, members and sympathisers of Fidesz are the main source of leadership in courts of different levels. The Fidesz-initiated amendments to the Constitution, as former president of the Constitutional Court László Sólyom put it, removed the last traces of separation of powers from the Hungarian constitutional system.

The second step was to undermine the media freedom. Putin chose to curtail the freedom of speech through the direct and indirect state ownership of the major national media and exertion of psychological and physical pressure on independent journalists and media companies. The murders of Anna Politkovskaya and Natalya Estemirova are only the best-known cases among dozens of others. In his turn, Orbán chose to introduce an institutionalised way of controlling the media: the pressure is exerted through the National Media and Infocommunications Authority whose members are elected by the Fidesz-controlled parliamentary majority. The head of the above-mentioned Authority also chairs the Media Council that regulates media content. Both chairs of the Media Council in Orbán’s Hungary, late Annamária Szalai and Monika Karas, have been linked to Fidesz. 80% of the population have access only to the Fidesz-dominated media.

The third step was to appeal to ultranationalism as a source of internal political cohesion. Both regimes consider their nations as organic communities threatened by external and internal enemies. Orbán never misses a chance to slam “profiteers, monopolies, cartels and imperial bureaucrats” of the EU that allegedly want to damage the well-being of Hungarian families. Putin’s Russia is straightforwardly anti-Western, with an emphasis on anti-Americanism. The US is presented as conspiring against Russia and using its political and economic weight to incite the EU to do the same. The internal enemies vary, but “national traitors” and foreign NGOs are common targets in both regimes. They are also concerned about the alleged foreign imperialism and its attempts to turn their countries into colonies despite both Putin and Orbán being revisionists whose visions of the borders do not coincide with the internationally recognised status quo. For Putin, the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) was “a major geopolitical disaster” of the 20th century that damaged the “Russian world” he is now trying to rebuild by endangering the post-war order. For Orban, the Treaty of Trianon (1920) after which Hungary lost around 70% of the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary was a disaster for ethnically defined “Hungarian-ness”.

The political systems under Orbán and Putin are right-wing kleptocracies in which the political power of the elites is used to extend their personal wealth at the expense of the wider population and provide material reward to loyal supporters of the regimes. Orbán’s Hungary is a milder version of Putin’s Russia, although the situation in Hungary has been deteriorating every year since 2010. The crucial difference is that Hungary is a member of the EU that can exert significant influence on Orbán’s domestic policies. However, it also seems viable that the potential strengthening of Russia as a regional power may produce further toxic effect and reinforce the illiberal tendencies not only in Hungary but in other Central European countries too.

A comment on the involvement of the Patriot of Ukraine in the Ukrainian revolution

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Adrian Karatnycky, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, has written a good article, titled "Warlords and armed groups threaten Ukraine’s rebuilding", in which he discusses important issues related to today's Ukraine.

In March this year, I wrote that the newly-elected (then acting) government had to "urgently address two most important problems: the military Russian invasion that [had] already started in the Crimea, the southernmost region of Ukraine, and the dire economic situation". Writing at the end of this year, Karatnycky argues that Ukraine's established government is relatively successfully dealing with these two problems: "Ukraine is intelligently addressing its key challenges: restructuring the national budget to avoid default and meeting the military threat posed by Russia".

At the same time, Karatnycky highlights another problem, namely "independently operating warlords and armed groups", some of which are guided by far right ideology, as well as the cooperation between these groups and Ukraine's Minister of Interior Arsen Avakov - the cooperation that I have briefly discussed here.

However, there is one inaccurate passage in Karatnicky's article, where he writes about "the notorious Azov brigade, whose members had been shunned during the Maidan protests because of their white-supremacist, anti-democratic views".

The truth is that the Patriot of Ukraine, a neo-Nazi organisation that formed the core of the Azov volunteer battalion in May 2014, was never "shunned during the Maidan protests".

For example, members of the Patriot of Ukraine (or Social-National Assembly that is yet another name for the Patriot of Ukraine) were taking an active part in the confrontation by the Presidential Administration on Bankova Street on 1 December 2013.

Members of the Patriot of Ukraine/Social-National Assembly with armbands with the neo-Nazi wolf's hook symbol. Bankova Street, Kyiv, 1 December 2013
Oleh Odnorozhenko, the ideologue of the Patriot of Ukraine, is watching the members of his organisation burning a flag of former president Viktor Yanukovych's Party of Regions. Bankova Street, Kyiv, 1 December 2013

During the revolution, some members of the Patriot of Ukraine were part of the Right Sector, while some others preferred to cooperate with C14, a neo-Nazi organisation that was then associated with the far right Svoboda party. (In his interview with BBC, the leader of C14 Yevhen Karas claimed that they were fighting against particular ethnic groups, Russians, Jews, Poles).

However, apart from Oleh Odnorozhenko, the ideologue of the Patriot of Ukraine, none of its leaders took part in the revolution, because all of them had been imprisoned since 2011. The leader of the Patriot of Ukraine, Andriy Bilets'ky, was charged with an attempt to commit murder.

All the leaders of the Patriot of Ukraine were released on 24-25 February 2014 at the initiative of MP Oleh Lyashko who put forward a resolution giving a number of jailed or convicted individuals a status of "political prisoners". Lyashko would later use the leaders of the Patriot of Ukraine for his PR campaign, but they parted ways afterwards.

MP Oleh Lyashko (in a suit) with Andriy Bilets'ky standing behind him, by the Ukrainian parliament, Kyiv, 27 March 2014
To reiterate: while the leaders of the Patriot of Ukraine were imprisoned during the revolution, its rank and file did take part in it, although they constituted a minor element of the whole far right movement that, in its turn, constituted a minor element of the revolution itself.

When I asked Adrian Karatnycky what he meant by saying that members of the Patriot of Ukraine "had been shunned during the Maidan protests", he replied that his source was Andriy Parubiy.

During the revolution, Parubiy was a coordinator of the volunteer security corps for the mainstream protesters. Since he was also coordinating the relations between the mainstream protests and the Right Sector, he simply could not have been unaware of the fact that the activists of the Patriot of Ukraine had been taking part in the revolution. If he indeed said that they "had been shunned during the Maidan protests", then he obviously lied. The question, however, is why take his words at face value, without taking into consideration the existing research on the participation of the far right in the revolution?

The fact that Parubiy lied about the involvement of the Patriot of Ukraine is also quite unfortunate. Actually, it was Parubiy who founded, in the second half of the 1990s, the original Patriot of Ukraine (it has little in common with Bilets'ky's current organisation), as a paramilitary wing of the Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU) that was renamed into Svoboda in 2004. Then Parubiy was one of the leaders of the SNPU and wrote racist articles that featured statements such as this:
Russia and the US are two centres of mondialism that essentially aspire to destroy the European spirit as antagonistic to their nature. Aspire to destroy the identity of the European nations. Yet they do not understand: barbarians may temporarily win, may destroy many things, but they will not destroy the European spirit, the spirit of the white race. Barbarians come and go, but Europe remains; Europe as the centre of the world spirituality and civilisation, Europe of the free nations.
For fairness' sake it should be said, that Parubiy has distanced from the SNPU/Svoboda already in 2004; he has refrained from using racist rhetoric ever since and seemed to have reformed himself into a mainstream national-democratic politician. This makes his lies about the involvement of the Patriot of Ukraine in the revolution even more unfortunate.

UPDATE: Adrian Karantnycky's article does mention that members of the Patriot of Ukraine (later Azov) took part in the revolution. He also clarified that Parubiy, when saying that the Patriot of Ukraine "had been shunned during the Maidan protests", referred only to his mainstream security units (called Samooborona) that allegedly shunned the Patriot of Ukraine. However, the Right Sector, which featured members of the Patriot of Ukraine, was the 23rd "hundred" (sotnya) of Parubiy's Samooborona, and it was Parubiy himself who allocated the 5th floor of the Trade Union building to the Right Sector.

Ликбез по определениям и классификации

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Учитывая терминологический беспорядок в русскоязычном и украиноязычном медиа-пространстве, я решил составить краткий ликбез, в котором объясняются различные понятия ("крайне правые", "фашисты"и т.д.), которые не только неверно употребляются в медиа, но и стали - совершенно несправедливо - ругательствами, хотя они являются научными терминами в политологии и новейшей истории.

Итак, крайне правыми (far right) называют все идеологическое поле, которое находится правее (т.е. является более радикальным), чем консерваторы (правые). Поле "крайне правые"является общим термином, который может употребляться для описания любой идеологии - от правого радикализма до нацизма.


Правый радикализм (right-wing radicalism, radical right), он же праворадикальный популизм (radical right-wing populism) - это "популистский и романтический ультранационализм, основанный на мифе однородной нации, в рамках которой нация ставится над личностью и ее гражданскими правами, что противопоставляет его либеральной и плюралистской демократии (но необязательно в пользу фашистского государства), ее основополагающим ценностям свободы и равенства и сопряженным категориям индивидуализма и универсализма" (Микаэль Минкенберг).

Мое собственное определение правого радикализма: идеология, основывающаяся на идее сохранения, реализации и воспроизводства этнически или этнокультурно однородного типа общества в рамках демократической системы. (Несмотря на то, что в определении Минкенберга присутствует тезис о противопоставлении правого радикализма и либеральной демократии, а в моем говорится о сосуществовании обеих систем, конфликта между двумя определениями нет: правый радикализм противоречит ценностям либеральной демократии, однако он может существовать в ее рамках, т.к. является ее легитимной оппозицией).


Если "миф однородной нации, в рамках которой нация ставится над личностью и ее гражданскими правами" - или если идея "этнически или этнокультурно однородного типа общества" - реализуется или предлагается для реализации путем насильственных действий, то мы имеем дело с правым экстремизмом (right-wing extremism, extreme right), который не может существовать в рамках демократической системы.



Фашизм (fascism) - это идеология, направленная на революционное обновление, "новорождение" (палингенез) нации (или расы), которая самими идеологами фашизма воспринимается как особый надличностный субъект истории, способный переживать как периоды упадка, обусловленного нарушением органической целостности нации, так и периоды восстановления или периоды повторного рождения (Роджер Гриффин).

"Фашизм"также является общим термином для описания различных видов фашизма. Например, в английском языке принято писать "Fascism"с прописной буквы, чтобы выделить конкретно итальянскую разновидность фашизма. Соответственно, если речь идет о не-итальянской разновидности фашизма (например, об идеологии румынской "Железной гвардии"), то слово "fascism"пишется со строчной буквы. Как и правый экстремизм, любая разновидность фашизма выходит за рамки демократической системы.

Нацизм (Nazism) - это разновидность фашизма, где объектом революционного обновления является не абстрактная нация, а именно раса (как бы она не опредлялась).

Префикс "нео-"в терминах неофашизм (neo-fascism) или неонацизм (neo-Nazism) указывает на временной период возникновения движений, организаций или партий, которые исповедуют фашизм или нацизм. Обычно "неофашистскими"или "неонацистскими"называют такие движения, организации или партии, которые возникли после Второй мировой войны. Однако использование префикса "нео-"для описания послевоенных фашистских и нацистских идеологий не является обязательным.

Как уже упоминалось в самом начале, термином "крайне правые"можно описывать как правый радикализм, так и любые разновидности фашизма. Схожим образом, термином "правый экстремизм"можно описывать фашизм и нацизм.

Формулы для запоминания:

Крайне правые = правый радикализм | правый экстремизм | фашизм | нацизм.
Правый радикализм + насилие = правый экстремизм.
Фашизм + понятие расы = нацизм.

Greek left-wing SYRIZA forms a coalition with the pro-Kremlin far right

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After a landslide victory in the early parliamentary elections held on 25 January 2015, the Greek Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) that secured 149 seats in the new parliament has surprised the left-wing voters and sympathisers by agreeing to form, already on 26 January, a coalition government with the far right Independent Greeks party (ANEL) that now has 13 seats. Popular support for the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn led by currently imprisoned Nikolaos Michaloliakos has slightly decreased: the neo-Nazis have secured 17 seats (one seat less than in 2012), but the Golden Dawn is still the third largest party in Greece.

Both SYRIZA and ANEL are so-called "anti-austerity parties" implying that they oppose reducing budget deficits as a response to the Greek financial crisis, as well as rejecting the austerity package put forth by the EU and the IMF. The "anti-austerity" platform may seem the only agenda that has drawn the two parties they share, but they also share a similar approach to foreign policy issues - an approach that may undermine the EU unity over the Russian threat.

Both parties are overtly pro-Russian, and SYRIZA's leader Alexis Tsipras denounced the sanctions against Russia imposed by the EU for Russia's annexation of Crimea and its invasion of Ukraine that has already cost Ukrainians thousands of lives. In May 2014, i.e. already after Russia had started its invasion of Ukraine, Tsipras travelled to Moscow to meet Vladimir Putin's major allies such as Valentina Matviyenko, chairman of Federation Council of the Russian Federation, and Aleksey Pushkov, chairman of the Russian parliament's foreign affairs committee. Both Matviyenko and Pushkov are sanctioned by the US, while Matviyenko is also sanctioned by the EU. This did not prevent Tsipras from holding a meeting with her.

Valentina Matviyenko and Alexis Tsipras at a meeting in Moscow, May 2014
According to Russian fascist Aleksandr Dugin, writing in 2013,
In Greece, our [i.e. Russia's] partners could eventually be Leftists from SYRIZA, which refuses Atlanticism, liberalism and the domination of the forces of global finance. As far as I know, SYRIZA is anti-capitalist and it is critical of the global oligarchy that has victimized Greece and Cyprus. The case of SYRIZA is interesting because of its far-Left attitude toward the liberal global system. It is a good sign that such non-conformist forces have appeared on the scene.
The pro-Russian sentiments of SYRIZA were manifested, in particular, in its voting behaviour in the European parliament. For example, on 16 September 2014, when the European Parliament ratified the EU-Ukraine Association agreement - an agreement that was one of the reasons of the Russian invasion of Ukraine - all six MEPs of SYRIZA voted against the ratification of this agreement.

If SYRIZA is Russia's "Trojan horse" in the EU, then ANEL led by Panos Kammenos may be even worse.

ANEL (founded in February 2012) is a far right party that - similar to the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn - opposes immigration, multiculturalism and is prone to conspiracy theories. For example, as argued by Pavlos Zafiropoulos, ANEL and its supporters believe that the Greek government "is spraying the populace from airplanes with mind-controlling substances". Anti-Semitism is not alien to ANEL either: "Panos Kammenos, speaking on a TV program made the baseless claim that Jewish people in Greece are not taxed in contrast to Christian Orthodox Greeks".

The driving force behind the pro-Russian approach of ANEL seems to be Gavriil Avramidis, who was elected MP with ANEL in Thessaloniki in 2012. He is also head of the Patriotic Social Movement "Greek-Russian Alliance" founded in 2001 and aimed at widening co-operation between Greece and Russia.

Yet Avramidis may be not the only politician in ANEL who is lobbying Russian interests in Greece. Kammenos visited Moscow in the first half of January 2015. Moreover, an article titled "An Attempt at Reviving the Russian Party" that was published on 22 January in the Greek Russian-language newspaper Afinskiy Kur'er (Athens Courier) discussed the pro-Russian approach of ANEL in general.

An article titled "An Attempt at Reviving the Russian Party" published in Afinskiy Kur'er (Athens Courier). Gavriil Avramidis is featured on the central photo
Several questions remain, however. Are pro-Russian sentiments indeed important for ANEL? Will ANEL contribute to the strengthening of SYRIZA's pro-Russian positions? Will the new coalition government push for lifting the EU sanctions against Russia that is escalating its invasion of Ukraine?

Doubtlessly, Russia will try to capitalise both on the victory of SYRIZA and the formation of the SYRIZA/ANEL coalition government. Putin has already congratulated Tsipras on his party's victory saying that he is "confident that Russia and Greece will continue to develop their traditionally constructive cooperation in all areas and will work together effectively to resolve current European and global problems". BBC correspondent Gabriel Gatehouse, currently in Athens, reports that he has seen the Russian ambassador Andrey Maslov entering the SYRIZA main office:
Kammenos' visit to Moscow was most likely connected to the possibility of the formation of the SYRIZA/ANEL coalition government. At the same time, Avramidis visited the General Consulate of Russia in Thessaloniki on 23 January 2015, i.e. just a few days before the parliamentary elections, to discuss, with Consul General Aleksey Popov, the renewal of the cooperation between Greece and Russia, as well as lifting the sanctions against Russia.

(left to right) Russian Consul General in Thessaloniki Aleksey Popov and MP Gavriil Avramidis, 23 January 2015, Thessaloniki
Since the EU is a consensus-based organisation, imposing or tightening sanctions against Russia requires all the Member States to agree to such moves. Hence, the issue of sanctions may become a negotiating point for the new Greek authorities when they meet with more influential EU players to renegotiate the terms of the bailout programme for Greece. SYRIZA and ANEL are "anti-austerity" parties in the first place, so their pro-Russian sentiments may increase the cost, rather than contribute to lifting or blocking, of the EU sanctions against Russia.


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