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Italian fascists from Millennium ally with pro-Russian right-wing extremists

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German version of this post can be found here: "Italienische Faschisten von Millennium verbünden sich mit pro-russischen Rechtsextremisten"

Following the visit of Polish fascists to Eastern Ukraine, in support of pro-Russian right-wing extremists of the "Donetsk People's Republic", now Italian fascists from the Millennium organisation pledge allegiance to anti-Ukrainian terrorists.

According to Pavel Gubarev, one of the leaders of pro-Russian extremists and former member of the neo-Nazi Russian National Unity, "anti-fascists" from the Italian Millennium organisation have come to Donetsk and will join the "military forces" of the "Donetsk People's Republic" under the leadership of Igor Strelkov.

Orazio Maria Gnerre (far left) and Pavel Gubarev (far right), Donetsk, June 2014
Pavel Gubarev (centre) and Orazio Maria Gnerre (far right), Donetsk, June 2014

Orazio Maria Gnerre (centre) and Denis Pushilin, the self-declared Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the "Donetsk People's Republic", Donetsk, June 2014

In terms of ideology, the Millennium organisation is the opposite of anti-fascism. Its ideology is close to neo-Eurasianism of Russian fascist Aleksandr Dugin with whom Millennium has been actively cooperating already for a few years.

Millennium's chief ideologue is Andrea Virga, born in 1987 in Casale Monferrato and currently a PhD student at the IMT Institute for Advanced Studies Lucca (Italy). His thesis is on Falangism in Cuba.

Andrea Virga complains about Italian anti-fascists who disrupted a Millennium conference at the Polytechnic University of Milan in January 2014
Millennium's formal leader is Orazio Maria Gnerre, who is also an editor of Millennium's journal Nomos - Bollettino di studi e analisi. Apart from being a fascist, Gnerre likes to get photographed with big cannons, as if compensating for something.

Orazio Maria Gnerre and two cannons

Orazio Maria Gnerre and a tank
Orazio Maria Gnerre caressing a big cannon
In summer 2013, Gnerre took part in the international conference "Russia and Europe: Dialogue of Resistance" that was attended, in particular, by the following far right activists: Felix Aleman, Natella Speranskaya, Adriana Ratmiskaya, Anton Zankovsky, ManuelOchsenreiter, Alexander Dugin, Tim Kirby, and some others. The videos from the conference can be found here and here.

Millennium has been cooperating with Dugin at least since 2012, when they met at a conference in Brazil, but more research should be done on Millennium's first contacts with Russian fascists.

(from left to right) Orazio Maria Gnerre, Emmanuel Riondino, Mateus Azevedo, Aleksandr Dugin and André Martin, Federal University of Paraíba, September 2012

Eurosceptic and Far-Right Parties’ Support Comparison 2009-2014

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Eurosceptic and Far-Right Parties’ Support Comparison 2009-2014 (European Parliament elections)
Source: European Elections 2014: A First Look Pro-European Perspective



Country
National Party
2009 (share of national vote)
2014 (share of national vote)1
Percentage change in national vote
Austria
Freedom Party (FPÖ)
2 MEPs (12.71%)
4 MEPs (20.5%)
+7.79%
Belgium
Vlaams Belang
2 MEPs (9.85%)
1 MEP (6.8%)
-3.5%
Bulgaria
National Union Attack
2 MEPs (11.96%)
0 MEP (3.0%)
-8.96%

National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria
1 MEP (7.95%)2
0 MEP (3.5%)
-4.9%
Croatia
N/A



Cyprus
N/A



Czech
Republic
Party of Free Citizens (Svobodní)
0 MEP (1.27%)
1 MEP (5.2%)
+3.39%
Denmark
Danish People's Party
2 MEPs (14.8%)
4 MEPs (26.6%)
+ 11.8%
Estonia
N/A



Finland
Finns Party
1 MEP (9.79%)
2 MEPs (12.9%)
+3.11%
France
National Front
3 MEPs (6.3%)
24MEPs
(25%)
+15.21%
Germany
Libertas (MPF -CPNT)
2 MEP (4.8%)
0 MEP (%)

National Democratic Party
0 MEP (0 %)
1 MEP (1%)
+ 1%
Greece
Popular Orthodox Rally
2 MEPs (7.15%)
0 MEP (%)

Golden Dawn
N/A
3 MEPs (9.4%)
+ 9.4%
Independent Greeks
N/A
1 MEP (%)
+ 3.5%
Hungary
Jobbik
3 MEPs (14.77%)
3 MEPs (14.3%)
- 0.47%
Ireland
N/A



Italy
Northern League
9 MEPs (10.2%)
5 MEPs (6.2%)
-4%
Latvia
N/A



Lithuania
Order and Justice
2 MEPs (12.22%)
2 MEPs (14.3%)
+2.08%
Luxembourg
N/A



Malta
N/A



Netherlands
Party for Freedom
4 MEPs (16.97%)
4 MEPs (13.2%)
- 3.77%

Reformed Political Party (SGP)3
1 MEP (6.82%)
1 MEP (7.6%)
+ 0.78%
Poland
Congress of the New Right (KNP)
N/A
4 MEPs (7.1%)
+7.1%
Portugal
N/A



Romania
Greater Romania Party
3 MEPs (8.65%)
0MEP
(2.7%)
-5.95%
Slovakia
Slovak National Party
1 MEP (5.56%)
0 MEP (3.61%)
-1.95%
Slovenia
N/A



Spain
N/A



Sweden
Sweden Democrats (SD)
0 MEP (3.27%)
2 MEPs (9.7%)
+ 6.43%
United
Kingdom
British National Party
2 MEPs (6.04%)
0 MEP (1.1%)
- 4.91%
UK Independence Party (UKIP)
13 MEPs (16.09%)
24 MEPs (27.5%)
+11.41%
EU

55 MEPs
(7.47% of EP Seats)
86MEPs
(11.45% of EP Seats)
+ 3.98%



Notes:

[1] These figures are provisional as many of the newly elected parties have yet to determine which political grouping to sit in. Therefore it is expected that some of these figures will change.
[2] Party ran as part of a joint list in 2009 and as such this result includes the overall result for the list as individual figures for the national Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria not known at this stage.
[3] In both 2009 and 2014 SGP ran as part of a joint list with Christian Union, the % figures are the vote share of the joint list and not of the individual party.

Freedom Party of Austria: pro-Russian far right lobbyists and merchants of deception

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German version of this post can be found here: "Die Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs – rechte pro-russische Lobbyisten und Händler mit Täuschungen".

I wrote previously that Putin's Russia cooperates with European far right parties partly because the latter help Russian political and business elites worm into the West economically, politically and socially, and that for them the far right's racism and ultra-conservatism are less important then the far right's corruptibility.

Take, for example, late Jörg Haider. For some, he was the long-time leader of the far right Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) and, later, the chairman of the Bündnis Zukunft Österreich. But for two Russian rich businessmen, Artyom Bikov and Aleksey Bobrov, Haider was a corrupt Governor of Carinthia who could be paid €900,000 in order to "assist" them in their naturalisation process. Imagine: the leader of an Austrian anti-immigration party took bribes to facilitate the acquisition of citizenship by non-Austrians.

FPÖ, under the leadership of Heinz-Christian Strache, is also involved in dubious deals and processes which are partly ideological and partly financial. The links between FPÖ and Putin's Russia are deep and numerous, so as a starting point let's take an almost random event: the conference "Colour revolutions in the CIS countries and their current impact" that took place in Vienna on 4 June 2010 at the Imperial Hotel.

(from left to right) Maksim Shevchenko, Sergey Markov, Heinz-Christian Strache, Bermet Akayeva, Vladyslav Lukyanov, Geydar Dzhemal, Levan Pirveli, Barbara Kappel. 4 June 2010, Vienna
As it could have been expected, everybody was discussing the "terrible" nature of the colour "revolutions" in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005). Strache particularly condemned the US that had allegedly orchestrated these revolutions with the help of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and National Democratic Institute (NDI). The presence of the representatives from the "affected countries" was not surprising: Georgia (Levan Pirveli), Ukraine (Vladyslav Lukyanov) and Kyrgyzstan (Bermet Akayeva).

The Russian team consisted of MP Sergey Markov (Putin's United Russia party) and two far right publicists: Geydar Dzhemal and Maksim Shevchenko. The latter, together with Pirveli, would be active in the workings of the Russian far right Florian Geyer club headed by Dzhemal. Its speakers included Russian fascists Aleksandr Dugin, Maksim Kalashnikov and Mikhail Leontyev, Swedish anti-Semite Israel Shamir, Russian "left-wing" activist Boris Kagarlitsky and Italian Nazi-Maoist Claudio Mutti among others.

First picture: Geydar Dzhemal and Claudio Mutti. Second picture: Aleksandr Dugin and Israel Shamir. Florian Geyer club meeting, 17 October 2011, Moscow
Also present at the conference in Vienna was Barbara Kappel, a member of FPÖ and, at that time, a member of the Vienna City Council. Moreover - and this is more interesting - she is a president of Austrian Technologies GmbH (founded in 2006), a federal agency for technology transfer and security research. In other words, Austrian Technologies GmbH promotes Austrian businesses abroad, but specifically in Russia where it operates through its branch headed by Julia Vitoslavsky. The latter also cooperates with the Austrian Chamber of Commerce and is a director of the Vienna-based Information Business Centre of Saint-Petersburg that is lobbying Russian business interests in Austria. However, Vitoslavsky does not seem to be engaged in far right politics and is, therefore, "normal" (apart from being involved in some weird "living energy" business).

Kappel's name often appears in connection with the FPÖ's cooperation with the Russians. In September 2010, she was one of the top party members who welcomed 20 Russian orphan children who came from  the Moscow Oblast to spend two weeks in East Tyrol under the patronage of FPÖ's Tyrol chief Gerald Hauser.

FPÖ's leaders (from left to right): Johann Gudenus, Barbara Kappel, Heinz-Christian Strache and Andreas Karlsböck. September 2010, Vienna
An act of philanthropy? Commenting on the Russian children's visit to Austria, Strachesaid: "It is my humanitarian duty to offer our help to the Russian friends". Who are these "Russian friends"? A possible answer to this question is provided by the FPÖ delegation's visit to the Moscow Oblast in 2011. On 11 May 2011, Heinz-Christian Strache, Johann Gudenus, Johannes Hübner, Andreas Karlsböck and Barbara Kappel travelled to Moscow to meetBoris Gromov (together with Gerhard Zeiler, a representative from the Austrian Embassy in Russia) who was then the Governor of Moscow Oblast. During the meeting, Gromov thanked the leadership of the party for their assistance in arranging the Russian orphans' trip to Austria and presented some souvenirs with the logo of the Moscow Oblast.

Roman Agapov, Aleksandra Kotova, Igor Parkhomenko, Andreas Karlsböck, Barbara Kappel, Boris Gromov, Heinz-Christian Strache, Johann Gudenus, Johannes Hübner and Tigran Karakhanov. 11 May 2011, Moscow
At the same time, the composition of the meeting shed some light on the real motives behind the FPÖ's philanthropic activities. Also present at the meeting was Tigran Karakhanov, then Minister of foreign economic relations of the Government of the Moscow Oblast, while Strache himself suggested that it was not all about helping Russian orphans: "Children are goodwill ambassadors, and it is through children that we hope to further develop cultural and economic cooperation with the Moscow Oblast". Was the FPÖ's "philanthropic act" some kind of a kickback?...

In 2008-2010, Kappel and her Austrian Technologies GmbH contributed to the development of a classical pyramid scheme called Aquabionica. This is a company that sells"Bionic Products - innovative products nano-technology, developed in conjunction with the nature". Aquabionica's main markets are Russia, Ukraine and some other East European countries where people are more prone to deception and manipulation.

Sergey Yarkov, Director of Aquabionica, and Barbara Kappel, Aquabionica's Vice-President
(two people on the right) Barbara Kappel and Sergey Yarkov
It is, however, unlikely that the Kappel and FPÖ were trying to promote Aquabionica at the meeting with Gromov. While pyramid schemes do provide good opportunities for money laundering (especially in Austria), they are hardly the topic one would discuss with the Governor of Moscow Oblast. Most likely, it was something different - something that would involve FPÖ's investments in the business structures of the Moscow Oblast.

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Jobbik acknowledges Russian military invasion in Ukraine

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Commenting on the planned military cooperation between Visegrád 4 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) and Ukraine, Hungarian far right Jobbik party acknowledged the fact that Russia is directly involved in the "civil war" in Ukraine.

First they blatantly recycle the Russian propagandistic narrative about the "civil war in Ukraine" and the "US involvement", but then they explicitly argue that if the Visegrad 4 military cooperation with Ukraine goes ahead, they would be confronting not pro-Russian separatists, but Russia itself. Thus, Jobbik forgot to follow the Russian line and - in a lucid moment - stated the obvious: It is Russia, rather than pro-Russian separatists, that is behind the chaos in Eastern Ukraine. Thank you, Jobbik - we knew it.

(in the centre) Jobbik's Béla Kovács, possibly a Russian spy, and Gábor Vona, leader of Jobbik in Moscow, December 2008

Putyin hasznos idiótái és Európa kis Ribbentropjai

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Putyin hasznos idiótái és Európa kis Ribbentropjai
Anton Shekhovtsov

Vita: Féljünk a putyini Oroszországtól?

A 2014 novemberében kezdődött ukrán EU-párti tüntetések, amelyek végül Viktor Janukovics bukásához vezettek, eléggé réijesztettek Putyinra, akinek két oka is lehet a félelemre.

Először is attól tarthat, hogy az ukrán tüntetések sikere átterjedhet Oroszországra, és ott is erős utcai ellenállás szerveződhet vele szemben, elvégre 2012-ben már voltak jelentős tüntetések ellene.

Másodsorban az EU-val kötött ukrán megállapodás, amely a kijevi tüntetések fő oka volt, végképp kihúzhatja Ukrajnát az orosz érdekszférából. Sőt, Ukrajna ezek után akar a NATO-tagságot is megcélozhatja, ami pedig minden orosz nacionalista legnagyobb félelme.


Oroszország márciusi reakciója, a Krím megszállásával és a keleti részek lángba borításával, éppen ezért bár meglepő, de nem egészen váratlan esemény volt. Az orosz történelmi és geopolitikai egyetemi könyvek már a kilencvenes évektől kezdve folyamatosan megkérdőjelezték Ukrajna önállóságát, területi integritását. Putyin maga mondta 2008-ban az akkori USA-elnöknek, George W. Bushnak, hogy Ukrajna „nem is egy állam”, és Kelet-Ukrajna nem más, mint “orosz ajándék”. 2013 szeptemberében pedig Szergej Glazjev, Putyin egyik szája, maga nyilatkozta, hogy ha Ukrajna aláírná a megállapodást az EU-val, akkor nem zárható ki egy orosz beavatkozás, “ha a keleti régiók ilyen kéréssel fordulnak Moszkvához”. És láss csodát: a keleti régiók végül tényleg ilyen kéréssel fordultak Moszkvához, legalábbis az a szűk szeparatista kisebbség, amely vindikálja magának a jogot, hogy a keleti régiók nevében beszéljen.

Az orosz inváziót és a kelet-ukrán területek oroszpárti, szélsőjobboldali szeparatistáit ugyan elítélte az EU, de csak ímmel-ámmal, és semmiféle komoly ellenlépést eddig nem tudott kitalálni. Ráadásul az európai közvélemény sem egységesen ítéli meg az orosz beavatkozást: miközben a vezető pártok ugyan elítélik azt, a szélsőjobboldali és szélsőbaloldali pártok nyíltan Putyinnal szimpatizálnak.

Történelmileg sem a szélsőjobb és szélsőbal együttműködése, sem a területfoglalás nem újszerű. A hasonlóságot a harmincas évekkel nem lehet nem észrevenni: a Ribbentrop-paktum, amely náci és kommunista (német és orosz) érdekszférára osztotta Kelet-Közép-Európát. Putyin felszólítása, hogy az Orosz Föderáció katonai erőt fog alkalmazni Ukrajna területén, Csehszlovákia és Lengyelország 1939-es megszállására emlékeztet, amikor mind a berlini, mind a moszkvai diplomácia ugyanazzal indokolta lépését, amivel ma Putyin: azaz a határon túl élő nemzetrészek védelmével.

Sok magyarázat van arra, miért is támogatja ennyire hevesen Putyint az európai szélsőjobb és szélsőbal.

Az európai baloldal számos politikusa és gondolkodója, akiket joggal nevezhetünk Putyin hasznos idiótáinak, Oroszországban azon erőt látják, amely megbonthatja az USA dominálta unipoláris világot és félretolhatja a liberális világgazdasági modellt. Mivel a baloldal majd minden európai országban gyenge, s egyedül nem tudja elhozni a csodás szocialista jövőt, Oroszországban bízik, hogy majd az buktatja meg a liberalizmust és a kapitalizmust. Eközben nem látják be, hogy Oroszország nem csak kapitalista, de kleptokratikus állam is.

A szélsőjobboldal támogatásának okai is sokban hasonlóak. A legtöbb szélsőjobboldali part ugyanúgy USA-ellenes, mint a szélsőbaloldal. A szélsőjobboldal nem a szocializmus eljöttét várja, hanem a multikulturalizmus végét, és úgy vélik, hogy Putyin autoriter-konzervatív ideológiája lehet a liberalizmus alternatívája. Közben persze nem veszik észre, hogy a Kreml által nyomatott konzervatív kultúrideológia és az orosz kultúra mai állapota, lepusztultsága, vulgaritása között óriási ellentét van. A mai orosz mainstream-kultúra minden, csak nem keresztény és konzervatív.

Ezen kis Ribbentropok nem veszik észre, hogy Putyinnak csak arra kellenek, hogy belülről zilálják szét egyes EU-tagállamok politiáját, tegyék instabillá az EU-t magát. A cél látszólag ugyanaz: Moszkva és az európai szélsőjobb szét akarja verni az EU-t. De Moszkva számára ez csak egy eszköz arra, hogy magához tudjon kötni európai államokat. Míg az európai széljobb a szuverén nemzetállamokról álmodik, Moszkva azért akarja elsöpörni az EU-t, hogy éppen e szuverén nemzetállamok szuverenitását, területi integritását kezdhesse ki sikeresen. Oroszország úgy akar világpolitikai és gazdasági világhatalom lenni, hogy Európát orosz gazdasági vazallussá tenné. Amikor Putyin „Lisszabontól Vlagyivosztokig tartó egységes Európáról“ szónokol, nem mond mást, mint a belga nemzeti bolsevik filozófus, Jean Thiriart, aki „Euró-Szovjet Birodalomról“ álmodozott. A kis Európa itt azonban Oroszország nyugati perifériája lehetne csak. A putyini egységes Európa Lisszabontól Vlagyivosztokig tartó orosz kleptokrácia csak. Egy ilyen Európában a szabadságjogokat ugyanúgy felszámolnák, ahogy a mai Oroszországban már felszámolták.

Putyin célja egyértelmű: meghódítani Európát Lisszabonig. Ehhez nem kellenek ma már erős tankok, elég az energiafüggőség kijátszása, és a belső közvélemény megosztása különféle hasznos idióták és önjelölt Ribbentropok segítségével. Az a határozatlanság, amivel az EU az oroszok ukrajnai inváziójára reagált, szomorúan bizonyítja, mennyire nincs tisztában Európa közvéleménye a nagyon közeli és nagyon fenyegető orosz birodalmi tervekkel.

Украинские нео-нацисты готовят "новую революцию"

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Read this post in English here.

1 июля в 12:00 украинская нео-нацистская группировка Социал-Национальная Ассамблея (СНА) планирует устроить беспорядки в Киеве.

В руководство СНА входят Андрей Билецкий, Игорь Мосейчук и Олег Однороженко. Вместе с другими членами СНА они были освобождены из тюрьмы - благодаря Олегу Ляшко - после победы украинской революции как политзаключенные, хотя они не имели никакого отношения к самой революции и оказались в тюрьме (кроме Однороженко) задолго до нее. Во время революции СНА формально входила в "Правый сектор" (ПС), а Билецкий и Однороженко даже были введены в "провид"ПС в марте, но многие члены СНА предпочитали базироваться не на 5-ом этаже Дома профсоюзов (база ПС во время революции), а в КГГА, который контролировался "Свободой"и ее нео-нацистским крылом С14 ("Січ"). С марта-апреля СНА также предпочитает сотрудничать с Ляшко, нежели с ПС, а Мосейчук даже был избран депутатом Киевской Рады по списку Радикальной партии Олега Ляшко.

Лидер СНА Андрей Билецкий - (вероятно) любимец журналиста "Громадське"Романа Скрыпинаи некоторыхдругихукраинскихмедиа - также возглавляет батальон "Азов".

Игорь Мосейчук и Андрей Билецкий

Неофициальный шеврон "Азова"включает в себя "черное солнце"и "волчий крюк" - бывший символ Социал-национальной партии Украины (ныне ВО "Свобода") и некоторых послевоенных нео-нацистских группировок в Европе, а также сегодняшний символ СНА.

В СНА также входят несколько человек, которые состоят в сетевом нео-нацистском украинско-российско-беларусском движении "Misanthropic Division" (MD). Члены MD также являются частью батальон "Азов". По словам представителей MD/СНА, их бойцы занимаются не столько анти-террористической операцией против (про-)российских экстремистов на востоке Украины, сколько сражаются "в рядах языческого батальона "АЗОВ"против отрыжек современного общества в виде, хачей, быдла, коммунистов, либералов, азиатов и прочих унтременшей". Как уже упоминалось, это происходит на фоне легитимации СНА со стороны украинских медиа, которые отказываются проблематизировать идеологию СНА и фактически обеляют расистов. При этом нео-нацистская природа идеологии СНА не вызывает никаких сомнений:
Наш Націоналізм є расовим, соціальним, великодержавно-імперським, антисистемним (антидемократичним та антикапіталістичним), самодостатнім, войовничим та безкомпромісним. Свою ідеологію Український Соціал-Націоналізм будує на максималізмі, національно-расовому егоїзмі, любові до свого, нетерпимості до ворожого та активізмі, здатному бути залізним тараном для розторощення чужої сили, що схоче стати на перешкоді Української Нації та Білої Раси.
Флаги СНА и MD
Скрин-шот из видео-обращения украинского MD к своим российским коллегам
Именно эти люди получили оружие от украинских властей и именно они собираются разжечь "новую революцию"в Украине: "огонь Белой революции вспыхнул в Киеве, и разгорается как белый рассвет, грозя выжечь всю нечисть с нашей многострадальной земли!". Цель "новой революции" - подорвать законную украинскую власть, внести раскол в общество и, таким образом, ослабить государство, находящееся фактически в состоянии войны с российским агрессором. "Ценности""Белой революции"СНА не имеют никакого отношения к демократическим, европейским ценностям украинской революции, а сама деятельность СНА является прямым нарушением Статьи 161 Уголовного кодекса Украины "Порушення рівноправності громадян залежно від їх расової, національної належності або релігійних переконань".

Современная история показывает, что любое оппортунистическое сотрудничество властей с крайне правыми в конечном итоге оборачивается проблемами для власти и для общества. Было бы наивным и инфантильным считать, что "польза"от СНА как участников АТО превосходит вред от них. Зачем именно СНА участвует в АТО мы уже знаем. Как скоро украинские демократы станут для вооруженной нео-нацистской банды "прочими унтерменшами"мы, к сожалению, сможем узнать в недалеком будущем.

Look far right, and look right again

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My new article for openDemocracy:

Look far right, and look right again

The Russian political establishment thinks that Ukrainians are 'traitors to Orthodox civilisation and Russian unity.’ But it is not only Putin’s Russia that is behind the challenge to democracy in Ukraine.


After this article was written and submitted to openDemocracy, Ukrainian neo-Nazi thugs, including militants from the Social-National Assembly, attacked the office of the Vesti newspaper), Kyiv gay club "Pomada" and put up a fight with the Maidan Self-Defence.

 
Neo-Nazis attack the office of Vesti

 

 
Neo-Nazis attack the "Pomada" club

The Kremlin Builds an Unholy Alliance With America’s Christian Right

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My guest op-ed for War is Boring:

The Kremlin Builds an Unholy Alliance With America’s Christian Right

Since the re-election of Pres. Vladimir Putin of Russia in 2012, the Kremlin has clamped down on independent media, established a draconian ban on “gay propaganda” and invaded the Ukrainian Republic of Crimea.

This new Russian government is aggressive, autocratic and moving further to the political right, argues Anton Shekhovtsov, a London-based expert on the Ukrainian and Russian far right—who originally hails from the Crimean city of Sevastopol.

The Kremlin is also reaching out to American conservative evangelicals as a means to find potential allies sympathetic to Russia’s rightward shift. In the following op-ed, Shekhovtsov explains why that’s dangerous.



Российский нео-нацист Роман Железнов просит политического убежища в Украине

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9 июля в Украину прибыл российский нео-нацист - Роман "Зухель"Железнов. В киевском аэропорту "Борисполь"его встречали представители украинской нео-нацистской группировки "Социал-национальная ассамблея" (СНА), лидеры которой составляют руководство спецбатальона МВД Украины "Азов".

"Одна вера, один вождь и один народ. У нас есть вера. Наша вера - это национал-социализм". ВыступлениеРомана Железнова на "Русском марше"в Москве 4 ноября 2012 года.
Игорь Криворучко (СНА), Анна Сенник (глава информационной службы "Азова") и Роман Железнов. Киев, 9 июля
В России Железнов известен как нео-нацист с двумя судимостями. Первый срок он получил летом 2009 года за то, что ранил из травматического пистолета несовершеннолетнего панка. Освободился в августе 2012 года. В мае 2013 года Железнов и еще один нео-нацист Алексей "Антицыган"Касичбыли арестованы, а затем приговорены к двум месяцам тюрьмы за регулярные кражи из супермаркета "Ашан". (Некоторые источники сообщают, что Касич также прибыл в Украину.)

Роман Железнов и Алексей Касич во время заседания суда
10 июля на пресс-конференциив "Maidan Press Center"глава информационной службы "Азова"Анна Сенниксообщила, что Железнов будет просить политического убежища в Украине, а затем будет подавать на украинское гражданство. В России, как сообщила Сенник, Железноваякобы преследуют за про-украинскую позицию. Однако это не соответствует действительности, а слова Сенник всего лишь говорят о попытках украинских нео-нацистов легитимироватьприсутствие российского нео-нациста в глазах украинского общества. В СНА хотят, чтобы Железнов возглавил "русский корпус"в составе "Азова".

Интересно отметить, что Железнов попал в Украину со второй попытки. 8 июля ему отказали во въезде в Украину в связи с запретом на въезд в страну российских граждан мужского пола в возрасте от 16 до 60 лет. По словам Сенник и Криворучко, удачному въезду Железнова в Украину 9 июля способствовал один из лидеров СНА Игорь Мосейчук, который является депутатом Киевского горсовета и заместителем командира "Азова", а также советник министра МВД Антон Геращенко.

Антон Геращенко, советник министра МВД Украины и пособник украинских и российских нео-нацистов
Один украинский Интернет-ресурс сообщает, что в аэропорту Железнова встречали "около 20 представителей "Правого сектора"", однако это неверная трактовка СНА. Эта группировка действительно находилась в составе "Правого сектора" (ПС) во время украинской революции, однако с марта 2014 года СНАпредпочитают сотрудничать с Олегом Ляшкои несколько активистов СНАучаствовали в выборах в Киевский горсовет именно от Радикальной партии Олега Ляшко. Именно от этой партии в Киевский горсовет был избран Мосейчук. ЗаявлениеПСо том, что Железнов не имеет никакого отношения к ПС, скорее всего соответствует действительности, что еще раз подтверждает наличие конфликта между СНАи ПС, который не является настолько радикальным как нео-нацисты из СНА.

Сейчас очень важно не допустить того, чтобы Железнов получил политическое убежище в Украине. Стране не нужен еще один нео-нацист. Тем более из России, тем более с двумя судимостями. Украинские МВД и СБУ в самое ближайшее время должны принять единственно правильное решение - о признании Железнова персоной-нон-грата на территории Украины и о его высылке за пределы страны.

Article: "Ukraine’s Radical Right" published in Journal of Democracy

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Journal of Democracy has recently published a new issue that features a special section "The Maidan and Beyond". Andreas Umland and I co-authored an article for this section:

Ukraine’s Radical Right

Abstract:
Thanks largely to the Kremlin’s information war, Ukraine’s ultranationalists have become global media stars of a sort, depicted in Western and other reports as key players in Ukraine’s third major political upheaval in less than a quarter-century. How do we explain the paradox of ultranationalist parties becoming involved in a protest movement whose thrust is toward greater integration between Ukraine and the European Union? And are the fears that swirl around these parties justified? The most obvious explanation for the Ukrainian far right’s ardent participation in the EuroMaidan may be found in the primary goal shared by all Ukrainian nationalists, radical and moderate alike: to liberate Kyiv from the Kremlin’s hegemony.

What Can Be Expected from Ukrainian Right in the Midst of Political and Military Crisis?

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My interview to Nikolas Kozloff, author of Revolution! South America and the Rise of the New Left (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) and founder of the Revolutionary Handbook project.

In addition to the military crisis in Eastern Ukraine and the rise of pro-Russian separatist rebels, Kiev now confronts a growing political crisis as the country gears up for new elections. What can we expect from the Ukrainian right, and how will nationalist forces seek to profit from escalating tensions with Russia? For answers, I caught up with Anton Shekhovtsov, a visiting fellow at the Institute of Human Sciences in Vienna and an expert on Ukrainian politics.

NK: In the aftermath of the Malaysia flight 17 disaster, the media has tended to examine events in Ukraine in military and geopolitical terms. Yet we hear very little about what effect the crash will have upon domestic politics in Ukraine and nationalist as well as rightwing sentiment. What are your thoughts?

AS: I don't think the crash has exerted much impact on domestic Ukrainian politics. Bear in mind that Kiev has been militarily engaged with Russian separatists for some time now, and so the Malaysia airliner disaster won't do much to change the fundamental dynamic one way or the other. I also don't believe this incident has had much of an impact upon nationalist groups, again for similar reasons.

NK: What's your own personal background in Ukraine, what is it like to live in a country on a war footing and how is heightened nationalism evident in everyday life?

AS: I don't live in Ukraine at the moment, but I was born in Sevastopol in the Crimea. I am from an ethnically Russian-speaking family, but I did not support Putin's annexation of Crimea. The last time I was in Ukraine was in May, and during that time I didn't pick up on nationalist symbols or rhetoric in Kiev or Lviv. To be sure, it's sometimes very difficult to distinguish between civic and ethnic nationalism. My impression, however, is that in general nationalism tends to take on a patriotic rather than a xenophobic character.

NK: I don't know if this is an indelicate or sensitive topic, but how does it feel to have your own home region taken away and annexed by Russia?

AS: It doesn't feel strange, but I am deeply depressed about it. I still have friends back in Crimea and I try to stay in touch. To be honest, however, I don't really feel like returning in the near future because it would be too emotionally disturbing for me.

NK: You didn't support annexation, yet many Russian speakers in Crimea were supportive of such moves. Do you feel unusual in that sense?

AS: What many people sometimes fail to understand is that being ethnically Russian and speaking the Russian language does not necessarily imply underlying loyalty to Russia politically or to Vladimir Putin for that matter. Indeed, Moscow is trying to promote this idea of "russkiy mir" or "Russian world" which is a very imperialistic notion and has nothing to do with Russian culture.

NK: Rightist forces fared very poorly in the recent presidential election. However, do you think they will do better in upcoming elections in light of military escalation in Eastern Ukraine?

AS: To be sure, Oleh Tyahnybok of the Svoboda Party and Dmytro Yarosh of Right Sektor fared quite poorly in the last election. Yet we also need to be mindful of another rising leader, Oleh Lyashko of the Radical Party who finished third. I wouldn't say Lyaskhko is a far right politician but more of a populist. However, he cooperates with right wing extremists --- serious Neo-Nazis and not some figment of Russian propaganda. My fear is that Lyashko is going to absorb a lot of this right wing sentiment and will benefit politically.

Oleh Lyashko (centre) with the members of the Azov battalion
NK: One frequently hears the word "populism" in conjunction with right wing Ukrainian political movements. What does the term mean in this case?

AS: When I say "populist," I mean that one offers simple solutions to complex problems. It's more of a rhetorical style than a set of beliefs. Lyashko himself has no ideology. People are frightened because of the war and they feel helpless in the face of Russian aggression. As a result, they find comfort in Lyashko's simplistic slogans.

NK: Do populist groups employ symbolism, clothing or music to gain adherents?

AS: For the most part, Lyashko employs military symbolism. During the recent campaign, he frequently made trips to the conflict zone where Kiev was conducting anti-terror operations. I don't think Lyashko will win the upcoming election, but he will steal votes from Svoboda.

NK: In the midst of such escalations and heightened Ukrainian nationalism, is there any chance that more progressive elements of society can compete in elections or form a viable political challenge to the status quo which is not only militaristic but also intent on following the diktats of the International Monetary Fund?

AS: Politically, such forces are not very viable or competitive in elections. There are some left wing/liberal forces which I would call progressive, but we're not talking about political parties but rather clubs, milieus or circles around particular magazines.

NK: How easy is it for people to counter right wing nationalism and what kinds of strategies do you think should be employed?

AS: I don't think the left can oppose right wing nationalism. Their share of the vote [if you subtract the old Communist Party of Ukraine, which isn't even that Communist but more pro-Russian] is smaller than the political right's. I think the only force which can counter right wing extremism is the mainstream political center. I also believe that honest investigative journalism which exposes the threat of right wing nationalism is quite helpful.

NK: The western left, such as it is, hasn't exactly rallied to the Ukrainian cause. Perhaps, this has something to do with the fact that Vladimir Putin is on the opposing side, and he is countering the bogeyman of U.S. imperialism. Sometimes, such rigid ideological positions can look an awful lot like apologetics for Russian expansionism, and you had a rather testy exchange with Russian scholar Stephen Cohen on Democracy Now! not too long ago. How do you think the recent air disaster, coupled with suspicions that Russia may have assisted the Ukrainian rebels, will affect this debate and do you think leftist commentators in the U.S. and Britain will now reconsider their positions?

AS: So far, I haven't seen any indication that they will reconsider their positions. Some people simply parrot what the Kremlin says, and accuse Ukraine of shooting down the Malaysian airliner. I expect that Die Linke, a leftist party in Germany, will probably hew to the Kremlin political line because it is anti-American. Nevertheless, I don't believe all western groups share this pro-Russian position.

NK: If you think the progressive media in the U.S. or Britain has fallen short in its coverage of Ukraine, how do you think such outlets should cover your country?

AS: Western media, just like Russian outlets, tends to deprive Ukrainians of any agency of their own. There's always a lot of talk about conflicting interests between the west and Russia, geopolitics, expansionist interests on both sides, etc. All of these issues are certainly legitimate, but somehow Ukrainians themselves get left out of the discussion.

NK: How should Ukrainian society come to terms with anti-Semitism and what are the hopes for a more multi-ethnic and tolerant society?

AS: First of all, Ukrainian society is already very multi-ethnic. Though the EuroMaidan was oftentimes depicted in dark and ultra-nationalist colors, the movement has spurred the growth of a civic nation. The myth of the "heavenly hundred" has helped to contribute and consolidate such civic-mindedness and constitutional patriotism. I'm referring to the 100 or so martyrs at the Maidan who were shot and killed by riot police. Ukrainians died there, but also Russians, Poles, Georgians, an Armenian and a few Jews. To be sure, xenophobic nationalists have sought to erase such memories, and they may even find fertile ground in some pockets of the population. But I'm not sure they will ever be successful in electoral terms, and I'm skeptical that Ukrainians would ever rally to a program aimed at "ethnic cleansing" or the like.

NK: In the midst of heightened tensions, do you think controversial nationalist figures such as Stepan Bandera, who was linked to the Holocaust, might gain more of a following?

AS: Like you say, Bandera is a very controversial figure. If you read a history textbook in central or western Ukraine, you'll see a chapter on Bandera but no mention of the fact that he was involved in the Holocaust or pogroms in Lviv. Typically, he is described as a national liberation fighter. Bandera has been glorified not because he was an anti-Semite but because he was a nationalist figure who fought against Soviet influence. When people glorify him, it doesn't mean that they are aware of this dark history or even endorse anti-Semitism.

NK: Speaking of ethnic minorities, are you concerned that in the midst of escalating tensions other outside powers like Hungary might pursue irredentist claims within Ukraine? Take for example the Transcarpathia region, where there are a number of ethnic minorities, including Hungarians.

AS: I do share some concerns about Hungary, a country which is currently being led by semi-authoritarian Viktor Orbán. Meanwhile, the far right Jobbik party is on very friendly terms with the Kremlin. Both have been making noises about Transcarpathia. However, I don't think this dynamic will lead to actual conflict in Transcarpathia.

NK: Thanks for your time!

Neo-Nazi Russian National Unity in Eastern Ukraine

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Here are some photos of the Russian neo-Nazi organisation Russian National Unity (Русское национальное единство, RNE) who are fighting against Ukrainians in Eastern Ukraine.

RNE's logo, a swastika, on a St. George ribbon hailed by Putin's Russia as an allegedly anti-fascist symbol
June 2014, Eastern Ukraine
June 2014, Eastern Ukraine
RNE's modernised logo
A neo-Nazi without a balaclava is Pyotr Barkashov (Петр Баркашов), son of the RNE's leader Aleksandr Barkashov (Александр Баркашов), July 2014, Eastern Ukraine
Aleksandr Kildishov (Александр Кильдишов), leader of the Volgograd branch of the RNE, July 2014, Eastern Ukraine
August 2014, Eastern Ukraine
(on the left) Pyotr Barkashov, August 2014, Eastern Ukraine
Pyotr Barkashov, August 2014, Eastern Ukraine
A unit of the RNE near Horlivka in Donbas area, August 2014
Pyotr Barkashov, August 2014, Eastern Ukraine
(on the left) Pyotr Barkashov, August 2014, Eastern Ukraine

Putin’s useful idiots and little ribbentrops in Europe

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The Ukrainian revolution that started from pro-European protests (Euromaidan) in November 2013 and eventually ousted former president Viktor Yanukovych in March 2014 turned Russian president Vladimir Putin’s blood cold. There were two major – political and geopolitical – reasons for Putin to be terrified.

First of all, with his antagonism towards mass protests, which his regime systematically crushes in Russia itself, Putin feared that Maidan – which, after the “Orange revolution” in 2004, has become a name for a successful popular protest – could be somehow transferred to Russia and cause problems to his rule.

Second, the signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU, which was the initial demand of Euromaidan, could effectively pull Ukraine out of the Russian sphere of influence. Furthermore, through the rapprochement with the West, Putin feared that Ukraine might wish to join NATO – an organisation that never ceased to strike terror into the hearts of Russian nationalists and military “hawks”.

What happened in March, when Russia invaded and annexed the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, as well as starting its open covert operation in the Eastern parts of Ukraine, was sudden but not entirely unexpected. Have not Russian university textbooks on geopolitics been questioning the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine since the late 1990s? Did not Putin say, in 2008, to former US president George Bush that Ukraine was not “even a state” and that “the greater part” of it had been a “gift” from Russia? Did not Putin, through one of his mouthpieces, Sergey Glazyev, warn, in September 2013, that the signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU could lead to the intervention “if pro-Russian regions of the country appealed directly to Moscow”?

American fascist Lyndon LaRouche, his wife and colleague Helga-Zepp LaRouche and current Putin's aide Sergey Glazyev, then Russian parliament chairman of the Economic Affairs Committee, June 2001
The Russian invasion and the Kremlin’s support – including arms, money and manpower – of pro-Russian right-wing extremists in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts have drawn condemnation from the EU, but this condemnation was not unanimous. While the mainstream political forces – conservatives, social-democrats, Greens and liberals – criticised the Russian aggressive interference in Ukraine, the radical right-wing and left-wing parties largely approved of it. The vote in the European Parliament on the 17th of March 2014, when it adopted the “Resolution on Russian pressure on Eastern Partnership countries and in particular destabilisation of eastern Ukraine”, has been revealing: out of 49 MEPs who voted against the resolution, 20 MEPs represented the far right, 26 MEPs – the left and the far left, and 3 MEPs were coming from generally Eurosceptic parties.

Historically, the strategic alliance between the far right and the (far) left is nothing new, as well as the annexation of a territory of another sovereign state. Thus, the similarities with the late 1930s were too obvious to ignore: the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that divided territories of Central-Eastern Europe into Nazi and Soviet “spheres of influence” and the consequent Nazi and Soviet annexations of these territories. Putin’s appeal to Russia’s Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly“to use the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine” reminded of the statements made both by Adolf Hitler following the Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1939 and by Soviet chief Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov on the eve of the Soviet invasion of Poland: all of them invaded these sovereign states on the grounds of protecting co-ethnics.


There are various reasons why the EU-based far right and (far) left are willing to endorse and approve of Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

European left-wingers, who rightly deserve – recalling the phenomenon of Western sympathisers of the Soviet Union during the Cold War – the title “useful idiots”, see in Russia a force that can challenge the alleged geopolitical unipolarity and the domination of liberal political economy. Being unable, due to their marginal role in national politics, to implement socialist and communist ideas in their home countries, they look at Russia as their last hope, despite the fact that Russia is not even a capitalist, but a kleptocratic, state.

The far right’s reasons to support Putin are partly similar. Like the left, most of the EU’s far right parties despise the US as the dominant power in the world. Yet, for the far right, the US is also the “hotbed” of multiculturalism and multiracialism – the ideas and practices which the far right strongly oppose in the EU. Parties like the French National Front, Hungarian Jobbik, British National Party, Austrian Party of Freedom, Greek Golden Dawn and some others also praise Putin for turning Russia into a “truly sovereign” state that does not reckon with any other world power. And, obviously, Russia’s positioning as the last remaining bastion of traditional moral values does not fail to impress the far right who seem to not distinguish between the Kremlin’s posture and the shoddy reality of Russian mainstream culture.



Front National's leader Marine Le Pen in Moscow, June 2013
What these little ribbentrops also fail to understand is that Putin is cooperating with them only to undermine and corrupt their countries. Of course, their strategic goal is mutual: the Kremlin and the European far right want to weaken or even abolish the EU. The far right cherish the utopic idea of returning to a nation state to bring back a mythic sense of national belonging. Putin, however, wants something very different, something which can be achieved by following a maxim “divide and rule”. Through undermining the EU politically, binding the EU countries to Russia economically, Putin aspires to turn Russia into a super power.

In the world where Russia indeed secures a role of a super power, European countries will become Russia’s economic vassals. When Putin talks about “a unified Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok”, one may remember the words of Belgian National Bolshevik Jean-François Thiriart who dreamed of the “Euro-Soviet Empire” and “Europe as far as Vladivostok”. These ideas may be attractive to some elements of the European far right, but for Putin, in his own vision of a space “from Lisbon to Vladivostok”, there is no Europe as we know it. This space will be called “Eurasia”, a kleptocracy extended from Vladivostok to Lisbon.

In this ominous reality, liberal democracy, rule of law, human rights, economic freedoms, equal opportunities and progressive values will be eliminated – as they have largely been eliminated in today’s Russia. The Kremlin will not need to invade European countries with Russian tanks: economic and political corruption is a weapon more clandestine, powerful and, eventually, virulent than conventional arms. The EU may be no bowl of cherries, but Putin’s useful idiots and little ribbentrops in Europe do not imagine what Putin has in store for them.

A German version of the article can be found here.

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(Pro-)Russian extremists in 2006 and 2014: the Dugin Connection

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In August 2006, Russian fascist Aleksandr Dugin and his Eurasian Youth Union (Евразийский союз молодежи, ESM) organised a summer camp where ultranationalist activists were further indoctrinated and trained to fight against democratic movements in neighbouring independent states. Looking at the pictures from that camp, I have identified at least five people who, in 2014, were engaged in the terrorist activities of (pro-)Russian extremists in Eastern Ukraine.

Andrey Purgin in the ESM camp, 2006
Andrey Purgin, 2014
Andrey Purgin, first "Prime Minister" of the "Donetsk People's Republic". In 2006, he was a leader of the organisation "Donetsk Republic".




Oleg Frolov in the ESM camp, 2006

Oleg Frolov, 2014
Oleg Frolov, a member of the "parliament of the Donetsk People's Republic". Like Purgin, he was a leader of the "Donetsk Republic" in 2006.




Konstantin Knyrik in the ESM camp, 2006

Konstantin Knyrik, 2014
Konstantin Knyrik, head of the information centre "South-Eastern Front". In 2006, he was a leader of the Crimean branch of the Eurasian Youth Union.




Oksana Shkoda in the ESM camp, 2006

Oksana Shkoda, 2014
Oksana Shkoda, representative of the general headquarters of the "Donetsk People's Republic".




Aleksandr Proselkov in the ESM camp, 2006

Aleksandr Proselkov next to Pavel Gubarev, "people's governor" of the "Donetsk People's Republic", 2014
Aleksandr Proselkov, "deputy foreign minister" of the "Donetsk People's Republic". Eliminated.



The Eurasian Youth Union was established in 2005 with the money from the Presidential Administration of Russia on the initiative of Aleksandr Dugin and Vladislav Surkov, then deputy head of the Presidential Administration. These pictures are only a small amount of evidence that Russia's war on Ukraine has been planned a long time ago.

French Eurasianists join (pro-)Russian extremists in Eastern Ukraine

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An Internet TV channel of (pro-)Russian extremists has published a video featuring four Frenchmen who came to Donetsk in Eastern Ukraine to fight against Ukrainian forces. They do not say their names and think that France will not know of their participation in the terrorist activities in Ukraine. Now it's time to reveal some of their secrets.

(from left to right) Mickael Takahashi, Guillaume Lenormand, Nikola Perovic, Victor-Alfonso Lenta in Donetsk, August 2014
(from left to right) Victor-Alfonso Lenta, Mickael Takahashi, Guillaume Lenormand, Nikola Perovic in Donetsk, August 2014

This video and other evidence I have gathered suggest that Guillaume Lenormand, Nikola Perovic and Mickael Takahashi, as well as Hungarian right-wing extremist Ferenc Almássy, first came to Moscow in the second half of June where they met Russian citizen Mikhail Polynkov. The latter is engaged in assisting international extremists to get to Eastern Ukraine.
Guillaume Lenormand and Nikola Perovic in Moscow, June 2014
From Moscow, Lenormand, Perovic and Takahashi went to Rostov-on-Don. There they were trained for two weeks and then sent to the Ukrainian city of Donetsk which is currently under the terrorist control. Either in Rostov-on-Don or already in Donetsk, they met another Frenchman: Victor-Alfonso Lenta.

Victor Alfonso Lenta in Donetsk, August 2014


Guillaume Lenormand (b. 9 April 1988) is coming from Normandy where he has been participating in various ultranationalist movements for ten years: Jeunesses identitaires (Young Identitarians), Parti de la France (Party of France), and Troisième voie (Third Way). "Lenormand" is most likely a pseudonym.

Guillaume Lenormand at a right-wing extremist meeting, 2013



Victor-Alfonso Lenta (b. 1989?) is coming from Toulouse. He is a former corporal of the 3rd Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment, and served in Afghanistan, Chad, Ivory Coast and Gabon. He is said to have been kicked out from the army for his involvement in a neo-Nazi group. On his return to Toulouse, he actively participated in the Jeunesses identitaires.

Victor-Alfonso Lenta in Gabon, 2009

Nikola Perovic (b. 1989?) has dual French/Serbian citizenship and apparently lives in Belgrade. He is a former corporal of the 13th Battalion of the Chasseurs Alpins and served in Afghanistan.

Nikola Perovic, 2012

Michael Takahashi (b. 13 October 1987) is coming from Paris. He is an ardent supporter of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and has been cooperating with various ultranationalist groups in France and Serbia.

Michael Takahashi, 2013


So, what are these Frenchmen doing in Eastern Ukraine? All four are extreme right activists who are influenced, especially Lenormand and Lenta, by the ideas of the European New Right. The four Frenchmen have founded a group called "Unité Continentale" (Continental Unity), and its manifesto provides further insights into the ideology they share.


They believe that the French government is "a puppet of Brussels" and that NATO is "a terrorist military alliance that uses French army to serve the interests of banks". The EU, in their view, denies France's national sovereignty, while France itself is "a slave of the American Empire that dictates the country's foreign policy and directly interferes in the domestic policy".


The solution of the alleged problem, according to the Unité Continentale, is Neo-Eurasianism, an ideology elaborated by Russian fascist Aleksandr Dugin, which they call "Continentalism". It rejects globalisation and liberalism, as well as advocating the destruction of the EU. Instead, they promote "cooperation between the major nation-states of Europe and their respective areas of influence". Russia would play an important role in this cooperation and, especially, in their fight against "Anglo-Saxon globalism, Atlanticism and the decadent West".

Brown blood Europe, a dream of Eurasianist fascists
The Unité Continentale's ideologues do not see the conflict in Eastern Ukraine as Russia's long-planned war on Ukraine. Rather, they think that the US and the EU have attacked Eastern Ukraine. Therefore, by killing Ukrainians, the Unité Continentale is waging a war on the US and EU. In an interview to one Russian website, Lenormand says that he believes that the West has started the Third World War in Lybia and Syria and it has now spread to Ukraine. Russia, in its turn, has challenged "the international globalism", and the Unité Continentale is happy to assist Russian forces and its proxies in Eastern Ukraine in murdering Ukrainian people.

They call it "Eurasian solidarity".


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19/84! Russian and European fascists reverse the 1945 Yalta Conference

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Everybody who is following the developments in Ukraine, which is now under a direct attack from Russia, has perhaps noticed that Putin's propaganda machine is joyfully playing with meanings and concepts turning them upside down.

The deliberate confusion that Putin's Russia produces and the inverted concepts it employs have an ideological underpinning: Russia is trying to hide its right-wing extremist attempts to undermine the post-war liberal-democratic order in Europe under the guise of "anti-fascist struggle".


One particular event scheduled for the end of August is especially indicative of this strategy.

On 29-31 August 2014, an international conference called "Russia, Ukraine, New Russia: global problems and challenges" will take place in Yalta, situated in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea currently occupied by Russia. There will be around a hundred of participants, but some of them deserve special attention:

Frank Creyelman (far right Vlaams Belang, Belgium)
Luc Michel (neo-Nazi Parti Communautaire National-Européen, Belgium)
Pavel Chernev (far right Ataka, Bulgaria)
Angel Djambazki (far right Bulgarsko Natsionalno Dvizhenie, Bulgaria)
Erkki Johan Bäckman (neo-Stalinist, Finland)
Márton Gyöngyösi (fascist Jobbik, Hungary)
Giovanni Maria Camillacci (fascist Forza Nuova, Italy)
Roberto Fiore (fascist Forza Nuova, Italy)
Mateusz Piskorski (far right Samooborona, Poland)
Konrad Rękas (far right Samooborona, Poland)
Bartosz Bekier (neo-Nazi Falanga, Poland)
Nick Griffin (fascist British National Party, UK)

The participation of these European right-wing extremists along with dozens of their Russian "comrades" in the conference on "global problems and challenges" implies one simple message:

The Kremlin-led "Fascist International" is going to Yalta to symbolically reverse the results of the Yalta Conference that was held there in 1945 and where the leaders of the anti-Hitler alliance discussed the post-war reorganization of Europe.

In a truly Orwellian fashion, at this conference in Yalta, right-wing extremists from Europe and Russia will take part in the foundation of the "Anti-fascist Council of the Russian Federation".

It's no longer 14/88! - now it's 19/84!

The “Russian World” will destroy Russia

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It has been 14 years since Pyotr Shchedrovitsky wrote that “russkiy mir” (Russian world) could be a potent source of Russia’s modernization. For him, the existence of “russkiy mir” implied the availability of “Russian capital” defined as “an accumulation of cultural, intellectual, human and organizational potentials expressed in the linguistic thinking and communication (humanitarian) resources of the Russian language”. Using this Russian capital and mobilizing the Russian diaspora could be a foundation of the country’s innovation and neo-industrial development.

Yet even then, in 2000, Shchedrovitsky’s modernizing and relatively progressive interpretation of “russkiy mir” was a lone voice in the wilderness of ultranationalist, isolationist and expansionist narratives about “russkiy mir”. Already under President Boris Yeltsin, Russian and Russian-speaking minorities in former Soviet countries were used as tools of political influence and propaganda, but President Vladimir Putin effectively formalized “russkiy mir”, by the end of his second term, as one of the most important socio-political instruments of consolidation and cultural legitimization of his regime.

In foreign policy, this concept means two things. First of all, as a diaspora, “russkiy mir” is supposed to be an agent of Russian soft power in the West in general and Europe in particular. Second, as a geopolitical concept, “russkiy mir” refers to East European countries that Russia wants to keep in its orbit and where it can intervene in case they prefer a different foreign policy.

"Free society"
In domestic policy, this relational concept implies that Russia is a unique civilization in its own right, neither a part of the West nor East. Moreover, Russia, as epitomized by Putin, is not between the West and East; rather it is the West that is to the left of Russia, and it is the East that is to the right of Russia. The latter evaluation is obviously incorrect as Russia’s Cape Dezhnev is the easternmost part of Eurasia, but it is not the East that serves as a reference for “russkiy mir” but the West. Essentially, it is the rejection of the West as a civilizational model and Western values as guiding principles that defines “russkiy mir” in domestic policy.

Domestically, the Kremlin needs the concept of “russkiy mir” as a justification for its failure to deliver good governance despite the favourable economic conditions: the Russian state functions to the benefit of a narrow elite rather than in the service of the public good; the rule of law is weak and the checks and balances system is broken; the government is unaccountable and meaningful competition among political groups is non-existent; civil and political liberties are rapidly shrinking away. As the country has not progressed since then President Dmitry Medvedev wrote his wishfully optimistic article “Go Russia!”, Russia can still be described, in Medvedev’s terms, as a backward, primitive economy based on raw materials and endemic corruption, with a weak civil society overwhelmed by paternalistic attitudes and stupefied by low levels of self-organization.

While Medvedev’s article called for modernization of Russia along the Western lines, the concept of “russkiy mir” is intrinsically deemed to declare the current condition as a unique norm and justify Russia’s non-Westernness and non-modernization. It is fair to say, however, that the Kremlin invested heavily in modernization of two spheres: a propaganda machine (prestige projects and state-controlled media at home and abroad) and the country’s repressive apparatus (police and army). In other words, the Kremlin invested in the instruments that help retain power and control the population.


When Russian ultranationalists such as Aleksandr Dugin declare that Donbas is a forefront of “russkiy mir”, they are actually right. A patrimony of ousted President Viktor Yanukovych, Donbas suffered the most from his inefficient and corrupt rule, but many people living in Donbas have mastered the way of living in this condition and were afraid of any modernizing changes that the Euromaidan revolutionary movement vociferously demanded. The reason why the pro-Russian separatism was initially relatively successful in Donbas – leaving aside the actual Russian leadership in the separatist movement – and not in any other region of Ukraine is not the imaginary threat to the Russian language or any particular pro-Russian sentiment as such. It is the patriarchal, authoritarian culture that ascertained that people’s survival was only possible in a highly hierarchical structure. Many people in Donbas either got used to this structure or invested a lot of energy in learning how to survive or even succeed in it. Moreover, they held to this patriarchal framework as they did not know – or were never offered – any other approach to organizing their lives. In post-industrial societies these people would be called “losers of modernization”, but since genuine modernization is yet to start in Ukraine, they can be called “cravens of modernization”.

The Russians’ strong support for Ukrainian “cravens of modernization” can be explained not only as an unconscious strategy that defends Russia’s citizens from the realization of their country’s extreme wrongdoing in Ukraine, but also as a way of coping with loneliness in their “russkiy mir” and a wish to believe that “russkiy mir” is a viable and competitive civilizational project. Since Russian-speaking people of Ukrainian Donbas are theoretically considered, by the official foreign policy of Putin’s Russia, an integral part of “russkiy mir”, their acceptance of Western-style modernization would be perceived – especially if this modernization is successful – as an existential drama for the Russians.

However, the threat to the Russians’ self-esteem and to the status of Russia’s culture comes not from the Ukrainians (whether they are Russian speakers or otherwise) who have embraced the European integration project. Rather, it comes from the aggressive and corrupt “russkiy mir” that – in contrast to its alleged aim to promote Russian culture – actually damages Russia’s image in a wider world and has a stagnating effect on the Russians’ socio-cultural development.


The Russians should not delude themselves by pointing to some European societies that may tend to oppose Western sanctions against Russia – this presumable opposition is driven by economic, rather than cultural, concerns. Moreover, the Europeans who oppose sanctions against Russia due to economic concerns will most likely express even more contempt for Russia because it made them feel uncomfortable as they put profit above liberal values.

Putin may never find his “face-saving Ukraine exit”, but the Russians still can. When Putin annexed the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and said that it “was just like Kosovo’s secession from Serbia”, it all looked like a metaphorical quote from Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment: “Shall I dare to stoop down and take, or not? Am I a trembling creature, or have I the right?” (Осмелюсь ли нагнуться и взять или нет? Тварь ли я дрожащая или правоимею...). To save their own culture, the Russians need to draw on its vast repository and walk Raskolnikov’s path until the end. Otherwise, “russkiy mir” will destroy Russia.

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The "Ukraine crisis" is a long-planned operation

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This article has first appeared in Norwegian newspaper Verdens Gang.

What is now known as the "Ukraine crisis” in the international media is hardly a properly Ukrainian phenomenon. The first uses of this phrase go back to the pro-European protests that started in November 2013 and ended with a revolution that ousted former president Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014. Yet even if the initial pro-European protests could be considered an internal Ukrainian development, their trigger lay beyond the country’s borders.

It was Russian foreign policy that has always been directed at preventing Ukraine from leaving Russia’s sphere of influence. Since the annexation of Crimea in March, “the Ukraine crisis” seems an increasingly misleading concept. Especially because the plans to annex Crimea and support separatists in Eastern Ukraine were designed by the Russian authorities several years ago and have little to do with the defence of ethnic Russians allegedly threatened by the new Ukrainian authorities.

We heard this story before, 75 years ago, when the Soviet Union invaded Poland under the pretext of protecting ethnic Ukrainians and Belarusians from the advancing army of the Third Reich. It was only in 1989 when the Soviet authorities admitted the existence of the secret protocol of the Nazi-Soviet Pact that was signed on the 23rd of August, 1939, and implied the division of Poland, Romania, the Baltic States and Finland into Nazi and Soviet “spheres of influence”. It was Soviet expansionism initially supported by the Third Reich, rather than a concern about ethnic Ukrainians and Belarusians, that was the first and only reason of the Soviet invasion of Poland.


Russian university textbooks on geopolitics published since the late 1990s routinely questioned the territorial integrity of Ukraine and, especially, the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Since the 1990s, Russian top officials regularly visited Crimea and spoke about the republic’s integration with Russia in future. In 2008, then Mayor of Moscow Yuriy Luzhkov was denied entry in Ukraine for his earlier speech about the “return” of Sevastopol, the major port in Crimea, to Russia.

For the Russian authorities, the “colour revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine that brought to power pro-Western governments in 2003-2004 was a sign that these countries were willing to leave the Russian sphere of influence choosing liberal democracy over semi-authoritarian kleptocracy. President Vladimir Putin perceived these revolutions as a direct threat to his rule: if Russian citizens see that post-Soviet countries such as Georgia and Ukraine can successfully modernize and democratize, then they may want the same for Russia – and this would dramatically undermine the authoritarian regime that Putin and his elites have built. Hence, Putin’s task was to subvert democratic governments in the neighbouring countries to prevent them from successful modernization.

Most importantly for him was to prevent former Soviet countries from joining NATO. Despite the fear of NATO that Putin and his colleagues from security services (or siloviki) inherited from the Soviet times, the expansion of NATO in the 1990s and 2000s posed a very different threat to what was claimed by the Kremlin. It had nothing to do with Moscow’s official line that NATO expansion near Russian borders was a danger to Russia’s national security. Rather, the organization’s system of collective defence secured member states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity, and this made it impossible or, at least, very dangerous for Russia to pursue its expansionist agenda.

(left to right) Vladimir Yakunin and Igor Sechin, two of the most influential representatives of the siloviki group

Russian expansionism has always been veiled by the rhetoric of concern about “Russian compatriots” in neighbouring countries. A year after the Ukrainian “Orange revolution” in 2004, Putin lamented about “tens of millions of our co-citizens and compatriots” who had “found themselves outside Russian territory”, and claimed that “the collapse of the Soviet Union had been a major geopolitical disaster of the century”.

It was in 2005, when the Kremlin’s siloviki revitalized their support for pro-Russian separatists in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. That year, the organization “Donetsk Republic” – a Russian proxy in the ongoing war in Eastern Ukraine – was created. Its leaders went to Russia in 2006 to participate in the summer camp of the Eurasian Youth Union that was established in 2005 with the money from the Presidential Administration of Russia on the initiative of Aleksandr Dugin, major ideologue of the Russia-led Eurasian Empire, and Vladislav Surkov, then deputy head of the Presidential Administration. This summer camp was aimed at further indoctrination of the activists and training for fighting against democratic movements in the neighbouring states. Instructors from security services taught methods of espionage, sabotage and guerrilla tactics. Among the participants of the summer camp was Andrey Purgin, who is now “First Prime Minister” of the “Donetsk People’s Republic”.

(from left to right) Oleg Frolov, currently a member of the "parliament of the Donetsk People's Republic", and Pavel Zarifullin, former leader of the Eurasian Youth Union, in the summer camp in 2006
A political discussion of possible NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia in 2008 prompted Putin to lift the veil on Russian plans concerning Ukraine. It was at the Bucharest NATO meeting when Putin told then President George Bush: “You don’t understand, George, that Ukraine is not even a state. What is Ukraine? Part of its territories is Eastern Europe, but the greater part is a gift from us”. In his official speech at the same meeting, Putin even suggested that rapprochement with the West might result in Ukraine’s loss of statehood.

For the Kremlin, the ideal “solution of the Ukrainian question” (Plan A) was to integrate Ukraine into the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia that would be transformed into the Eurasian Union in 2015, and, consequently, prevent the country from signing an Association Agreement with the EU. If Ukraine did not cooperate in this regard, then the Russian invasion of Ukraine would be Plan B. In September 2013, when the Ukrainian authorities still discussed the prospects of signing the Association Agreement with the EU, Putin’s aide Sergey Glazyev explicitly stated that if Ukraine signed the Agreement, Russia could no longer guarantee Ukraine’s status as a state and could intervene “if pro-Russian regions of the country appealed directly to Moscow”. The Ukrainian revolution that set the country on the pro-European course was a signal for Moscow to launch that Plan B.

The Kremlin and its propaganda machine depict the annexation of Crimea as an act of defending ethnic Russians, and the current conflict in Eastern Ukraine – as a Ukrainian civil war. This narrative cannot be any further from the truth. What has been going on in Ukraine since February 2014 is an operation that Russia developed several years ago for the event of Ukraine willing to become a part of the family of European free, democratic nations.

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Please help to identify participants of the Yalta conference

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I need help in identifying participants of the international conference "Russia, Ukraine, New Russia: global problems and challenges" that took place on 29-31 August 2014 in Yalta, situated in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea currently occupied by Russia.

I have already identified* a few people but many are still unknown to me. I will also be grateful for additional pictures of people taken at the conference.

* Thanks to friends, colleagues and commentators, more names are now added.
Photo 1: (left to right) XXX, Aleksey Anpilogov, Yegor Kvasnyuk

Photo 2: Yegor Kvsnyuk

Photo 3: (front row) XXX, Tatiana Karatsouba Seid-Burkhan, XXX, Yegor Kvasnyuk. Who else is there?

Photo 4: (left to right) Aleksey Mozgovoy, Pyotr Getsko, Kirill Frolov

Photo 5: (left to right) Maksim Shevchenko, Sergey Glazyev, Aleksey Mozgovoy, Aleksey Anpilogov

Photo 6: Yegor Kholmogorov

Photo 7: Front row: Tatiana Karatsouba Seid-Burkhan, XXX, Yegor Kvasnyuk, Andrey Kovalenko, Erkki Johan Bäckman. Who else is there?

Photo 8: I see Israel Shamir (second from the left). Who else is there?

Photo 9: Tatiana Karatsouba Seid-Burkhan, XXX

Photo 10: I see Kirill Frolov and Yegor Kholmogorov. Who else is there?

Photo 11: The man in a blue shirt is Roberto Fiore; who is the black shirt? The man in a red shirt is Yuriy Pershikov.

Photo 12: (far right) Yuri Kofner. Who else?

Photo 13

Photo 14: Front row: Oleg Rodivilov, Aleksandr Svistunov. Who else is there?

Photo 15: (left to right) Alena Berezovskaya, XXX
Photo 16: Roberto Fiore, Yuriy Pershikov, Oleg Rodivilov, Aleksandr Svistunov, Kirill Frolov. Who else is there?
Photo 17: (left to right) Luc Michel, XXX

Boris Kagarlitsky, a Kremlin's mole in the leftist movement (updated)

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Deluded British leftists like to invite Russian allegedly left-wing publicist Boris Kagarlitsky of the Institute for Globalization Studies and Social Movements to take part in their events.

On 2 June this year, he joined, via Skype, the founding meeting of the "Solidarity with the Antifascist Resistance in Ukraine" that was attended by Richard Brenner, Lindsey German (Counterfire), Andrew Murray (Communist Party of Great Britain), Alan Woods (International Marxist Tendency) and Sergei Kirichuk (Borotba).

On 27 August, he spoke at the public meeting "How to stop the spread of War". Other speakers and participants included Tariq Ali, Lindsey German, Jeremy Corbyn MP, Owen Jones, Francesca Martinez, Stafford Scott, Kate Smurthwaite, and Christian Fuchs.


Boris Kagarlitsky speaking at the meeting "Solidarity with the Antifascist Resistance in Ukraine", 27 August 2014, London
In Russia, however, Kagarlitsky prefers a different company. I have already mentioned that Kagarlitsky took part in a meeting of the Russian far right "Florian Geyer" club headed by Russian right-wing Islamist Geydar Dzhemal and frequented by Russian fascists such as Aleksandr Dugin, Maksim Kalashnikov and Mikhail Leontyev, Swedish anti-Semite Israel Shamir and Italian Nazi-Maoist Claudio Mutti among others.

Kagarlitsky (and Richard Brenner) also took part in the conference "The world crisis and the conflict in Ukraine" held in annexed Yalta on 6-7 July 2014 and co-organised by his Institute for Globalization Studies and Social Movements. Other co-organisers of this conference - the ultranationalist "Novaya Rus" (New Russia) headed by Aleksey Anpilogov - held a second conference titled "Russia, Ukraine, New Russia: global problems and challenges", to which they invited international fascists such as Frank Creyelman (Vlaams Belang), Luc Michel (Parti Communautaire National-Européen), Márton Gyöngyösi (Jobbik), Roberto Fiore (Forza Nuova), Mateusz Piskorski (Samooborona) and Nick Griffin (British National Party). (Only Piskorski and Fiore, however, were able to come.)

And here is a photograph that features Kagarlitsky in a company of Russian fascists: Aleksey Belyaev-Gintovt (prominent member of Aleksandr Dugin's International Eurasian Movement), Yevgeniy Zhilin (militant extreme right Oplot group), Konstantin Krylov (far right "Russian Social Movement - Russia") and Yegor Kholmogorov.

Boris Kagarlitsky in a company of Russian fascists, September 2014, Moscow (?)
Next time, British leftists may want to invite Kagarlitsky's fascist friends to some left-wing meeting in London too.

Russian investigative journalists have established that Kagarlitsky has been cooperating with the Kremlin at least since 2005. His task has been to help control the Russian left-wing movement outside the sphere of influence of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). In 2006, he published a report titled "Gale Warning" that aimed at exploring the levels of corruption within Russian political parties. According to Kagarlitsky, the CPRF was the most corrupt party in Russia. While I have no doubts that the CPRF is a corrupt organisation, the most interesting and revealing aspect of Kagarlitsky's report is that he completely ignored two major Russian parties: pro-PutinUnited Russia and Vladimir Zhirinovsky's far right, misleadingly named Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia. Kagarlitsky's report has nothing on them - a quite telling omission. (The CPRF's leader Gennadiy Zyuganov successfully sued Kagarlitsky for libel, and the latter made an apology.)

Internationally, Kagarlitsky holds himself as a critic and opponent of Putin's regime, but in fact he is a tool of this very regime, a tool that is used to tamp down the genuinely left-wing anti-Putin movement in Russia. It is, therefore, not surprising that Kagarlitsky's Institute for Globalization Studies and Social Movements became one of the organisations that have recently received grants from the Kremlin. Kagarlitsky is doing a good job throwing dust in the eyes of the international left, so Putin knows that he is worth financial support.
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